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Executive Summary 
 
Greece is, today, the EU member state where journalism and the media face their 
most acute crisis. Since the 1980s and 1990s, deregulation has allowed the market 
entry of commercial channels that increased the viewing choice for audiences in 
Greece. The legal and regulatory framework actively promoted the concentration of 
press, television and radio outlets that are owned by large organisations, which co-
existed alongside the public broadcaster ERT.  
 
Regulation has been ineffective, with private channels operating with temporary 
licenses and independent regulatory authorities functioning superficially and 
ambivalently. As a result, the market has been dominated by a handful of powerful 
newspaper interests which have expanded into audiovisual and online media. Recent 
laws have further liberalized media ownership and cross-ownership.  
Historically, the Greek state has intervened in all aspects of economic and social life, 
the media very much included. It has acted as censor (during the dictatorship), 
owner (of public television and radio), and subsidiser of newspapers and electronic 
media. The intertwining of the political elite and the media has generated a 
journalistic culture that is cautious of reporting news that state officials could find 
challenging. With media market deregulation, clientelism gradually became deeper 
and more intricate, with intertwining interests (diaploki) between large media 
This study identifies the most urgent problems of media policy in Greece as they 
affect independent journalism. These problems are prioritized byir relationship 
to European-level policy activity and to OSF concerns. The study is based on 
desktop research, literature review of sources in English and Greek, as well as a 
set of in-depth interviews with relevant actors, conducted in Athens in 
November 2014. The report was drafted before the government scheduled a 
general election for 25 January. 
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organizations, their owners (who are also active in key sectors of the economy 
including public procurement and projects), and the political elite.  
These arrangements have damaged journalism, as state and private interests have 
steered editorial choices.  The financial crisis and the austerity measures imposed 
since 2010 have served to strengthen these relationships. The major mainstream 
media organizations have presented current government policies favourably, at the 
expense of pluralism and independent journalism, and despite the increasing 
hardship suffered by the middle and lower classes. At the extreme, major 
commercial media companies have kept silent about a number of sensitive 
developments, including the imposition of legislation against employee rights and 
pension cuts.  
The abrupt closure of the public broadcaster ERT in 2013 further damaged pluralism 
in Greek journalism, for ERT was the only broadcaster – in a market dominated by 
unlicensed commercial channels – with a legal obligation to provide objective, 
unbiased news. In addition, ERT had a diverse program and a wide audience, both in 
Greece and abroad. The shutdown contributed to a deteriorating landscape 
regarding the overall quality of journalistic independence. The dismissal of some 
2,700 permanent and 300 temporary employees with no prior consultation has 
forced them into unemployment or to seek work in private media under uncertain 
conditions. E‘T͛s replaĐeŵeŶt, NE‘IT, has been criticized for not functioning as an 
independent public broadcaster.  
 
The ERT shutdown also left the development of digital terrestrial television (DTT) to 
the large private media operators, with further consequences for pluralism and 
democracy. In the last five years, the Digea consortium, controlled by the private 
national television channels, has established itself as the sole provider of DTT in 
Greece. In consultation with the telecoms regulator and the relevant ministry, Digea 
was the only candidate in the auction for the allocation of digital frequencies and can 
now take decisions on the digital compression format, the digital frequencies to be 
used, and the areas where they would start simulcasting. Digea controls the digital 
terrain and its monopoly raises serious concerns about pluralism and independent 
journalism under austerity conditions, for the presence of anti-austerity opinion on 
its frequencies is expected to be limited. 
  
The financial crisis together with the tough fiscal measures, including heavy 
reductions in salaries and pensions and numerous layoffs in the public sector, have 
accelerated the downward trend in newspaper circulation and led to the closure of 
several outlets. Reduced income from advertising and other sources of funding has 
had an impact on the employment of media staff in general and print journalists in 
particular: redundancies and the abandonment of collective agreements have forced 
many journalists to accept vulnerable low-status work conditions with very low 
salaries. Under strict editorial control of critical views of government policies and the 
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intricate system of political/economic/media dependencies, the practice of 
jourŶalists͛ self-ĐeŶsorship is oŶ the rise so as to safeguard oŶe͛s joď.  
 
Under these pressures, self-organized groups and networks of journalists and other 
media personnel have started exploring new models of journalism. Prominent 
eǆaŵples are the Editors͛ Neǁspaper ;EfSyn), the magazine Unfollow, and the online 
Press Project. But these initiatives cannot help the independent journalists who find 
themselves on the receiving end of accusations of defamation, of lawsuits that carry 
a heavy financial penalty, of blackmail and threats against their lives and their 
families, of intimidation and violence at police hands during demonstrations.  
 
The internet has become increasingly prominent in the media landscape, offering the 
potential for greater pluralism and independence, yet it has also been implicated in 
low-quality output, gossip, copy-and-paste news, and dependence on big firm 
advertisements.   
 
The media situation is bleak, though it may improve after the 25 January elections. 
The opposition SYRIZA party has pledged to re-open ERT if it forms a government. It 
has also declared that permanent licenses will be granted to private channels on the 
basis of competition. Moreover, a post-austerity agenda – if any such emerges from 
the election – could help to improve employment conditions for journalists.  
 
Self-organization in media production and the quest for new sustainable business 
models will become more and more important. Greater mobilization by civil society, 
involving trade unions and universities among others, is needed to promote 
pluralism, transparency, and objective journalism. Links with inter-governmental 
organizations such as the UN and the EU, as well as with international organizations, 
will be pivotal.   
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Overview of the Greek media market  
 
Print media emerged in Greece alongside the struggle for independence from the 
Ottoman rule (Koumarianou, 2005) and developed hand-in-hand with the growth of 
political life in the new nation-state (Papadimitriou, 2005). Television broadcasting 
was introduced in 1966, with the first network, ERT (Hellenic Broadcasting 
Corporation) broadcasting out of the capital Athens as a state-owned monopoly. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the trends towards commercialization and 
deregulation allowed the entry of various commercial channels that increased the 
viewing options for audiences. Many media outlets appeared in a small market of 
just 11 million people, to the extent that the media landscape today displays an 
excess of supply over demand. From being a broadcasting field of two public 
television channels and four radio stations in the late 1980s, it has become an 
overcrowded environment comprising 160 private television channels and 1,200 
private radio stations, none of them equipped with an official license to broadcast  
(only temporary licenses renewed by successive governments) (Papathanassopoulos, 
2014a). 
 
Thus private television expanded rapidly, but it strives to adjust to a pluralistic profile 
in a highly politicized and commercialized environment, driven by increasing 
populism. Meanwhile, levels of media market concentration have risen as newspaper 
publishers diversified into television to increase profits in a largely unregulated and 
non-transparent media market (Iosifidis, 2007). 
 
The ͚goldeŶ age͛ of Greek media and journalism in the 1980s and 1990s, prior to the 
crisis, did not result in modern, robust organizations but led instead to unchecked 
diversification, high production costs, and – most worryingly – the consolidation of 
close relations between the media and the political elite. The resulting concentration 
of media ownership and the close ties with politicians have negatively affected the 
ŵedia͛s perforŵaŶĐe, as the media were more interested in cultivating connections 
ǁith the politiĐal elite aŶd ŶegleĐted their ͚ǁatĐhdog͛ role. The so-called diaploki 
(translated in this report as ͚iŶtertǁiŶiŶg iŶterests͛Ϳ and the domination of the media 
environment by wealthy businessmen with interests in shipping, 
telecommunications, refining and other sectors) reflect this reality.  
 
These developments have had broad implications for democracy, media pluralism, 
and journalistic independence. The effects on Greek journalism of media 
commercialization, market expansion, and intertwining interests have been 
devastating. Although journalism appears to play an active social and political role, 
setting the agenda and representing the ordinary citizen, it is in fact heavily 
influenced by the self-regulatory constraints imposed by media organizations 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2001). 
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The ongoing financial crisis and recession have affected the media sector as a whole 
and many media outlets have become financially unsustainable. Newspaper 
circulation has fallen dramatically; it is striking that the average daily circulation of 
political newspapers in 2011 was only 216,500 copies, compared to 400,000 copies in 
2005 (see Appendix 1). Financial pressures have resulted in tighter relations between 
the media, politics and the economic system (including banking), as well as 
increasing reliance on advertising, with significant impact on the profession of 
journalism. In parallel, the closure of public broadcaster ERT in 2013 further 
undermined pluralism and media output. Furthermore, the lack of digitization policy 
has left the process of the digital switch-over entirely to the market. 
 
Regulatory framework 
 
In order for a person or a company to enter the broadcasting market they must 
obtain a license from the national regulatory body. The law does not stipulate 
specific requirements for other types of media, so general competition and anti-trust 
rules apply to print and online media. 
The National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV), which was set up by Law 1866 
(1989) and amended by Law 2683 (2000), is a seven-member body with a president, 
a vice president and five members, all appointed by the Parliament.  It has sole 
responsibility for granting broadcasting licenses, while it also exercises enforcement 
(monitoring, supervision and sanctioning) in the radio and television sectors. Its 
mandate is to guarantee that public and private broadcasters comply with domestic 
and European legislation. The council is responsible for supervising broadcast 
content regulation and is assigned the task of licensing the radio and television 
channels transmitted by terrestrial, cable and satellite networks in line with pre-
defined criteria. As such, NCRTV͛s role remains limited to ensuring compliance with 
domestic and European Union provisions. In conjunction with the 
telecommunications regulator HTPC (Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission) and the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC), the NCRTV has the 
competence to assess market abuses in the media and communications sector. In 
addition, NCRTV can draft codes of conduct for advertising and news and 
entertainment programs, but its involvement in the formulation of normative rules 
has been marginal or non-existent mainly due to its political (but also financial) 
dependence on the government.   
In reality, NCRTV has not established itself as an authoritative body that effectively 
regulates the media or protects media independence. For example, the law gives the 
Council powers to grant broadcasting licenses (see above), but in practice it is the 
government of the day that takes the final decision (Papathanassopoulos, 1993; 
Panagiotopoulou, 2004; Zacharopoulos and Paraschos, 1993). Likewise, its sanctions 
can be selective, and it is seen as being more accommodating towards programs that 
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support the government. 
1
 The politicized procedure for appointing members to the 
NCRTV board has compromised its independence and capability: all seven members 
are elected by the Conference of Presidents, a cross-party parliamentary body, with a 
4/5 majority upon nomination by the governing party, something which makes 
renewing the Council quite cumbersome. The difficulty in meeting the 4/5 
requirement has led to the automatic extension of the terms of the current council 
members, who have exceeded the legal duration of their term (four plus four years) 
by means of successive decisions of the responsible minister, though their mandate 
has expired. This has raised serious ĐoŶĐerŶs aďout the legalitǇ of the CouŶĐil͛s 
decisions and independence. At the same time, the members themselves are not 
inclined to resign on points of principle under austerity conditions. 
A concrete eǆaŵple of NC‘TV͛s iŶaďilitǇ to regulate the ŵarket relates to ŵedia 
ownership. The Council publishes information on media ownership and shareholding, 
but does not really engage in a vigorous assessment of their compatibility with the 
law. An example demonstrating this was the lack of monitoring of the finances of 
former national television channel ALTER, which closed in 2012.
2
 Meanwhile, the 
limited expertise of the members of the board, their part-time term of employment 
(only the president and the vice-president are full-time), the lack of financial 
independence (as its budget has to be approved by the minister), together with 
insufficient staff and information technology equipment has further harmed the 
performance of NCRTV (Psychogiopoulou et al., 2011). Generally speaking, it appears 
that there is a ďig differeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ NC‘TV͛s ŶoŵiŶal poǁers aŶd its aĐtual 
functioning.  
                                                          
1
 The opposition party SYRIZA has resorted to NCRTV several times in the recent past. One case 
involved a program shown a few hours before the 2014 European elections, which presented bleak 
scenarios in the event of a SYRIZA win. SYRIZA claimed that pluralism and balanced presentation had 
been violated, but NCRTV shelved the case. In other cases, NCRTV has imposed fines for satirical 
programs that are highly sarcastic about the government (AN, interview). 
2
 ALTER, a national TV channel launched in 1995, closed in February 2012 declaring its inability to 
continue operations due to debts. The closure was widely attributed to bad management, lack of 
budget transparency and excessive borrowing, all of which led to huge debts. The staff – who were 
not being paid anyway – were made redundant. The closure of ALTER demonstrates the lack of 
proper monitoring by successive governments and NCRTV, which did not undertake regular checks 
concerning the financial viability of ALTER. It is striking that 1999 was the final year in which ALTER 
underwent a rigorous audit. Although the balance sheets in the four-year interval 2005-2009 
appeared to be positive thanks to bank loans, in reality the organization accumulated a huge 
financial imbalance and this became apparent in the midst of the economic crisis when banks 
stopped giving out loans so easily. 
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Ownership transparency 
Main players in the Greek media landscape (see also Appendix) 
Similarly to other Southern European countries, newspaper readership in Greece is 
very low (53 in 1,000 people, which is among the lowest in the developed world), 
despite the high levels of literacy and education. However, the Greek print media 
industry is characterised by oversupply and in 2008, just before the financial crisis, it 
consisted of around 280 local, regional, and national daily newspapers 
(Papathanassopoulos and Mpakounakis 2010). In 2012, after a number of newspaper 
had closed down, the country had 15 national daily newspapers (including TA NEA, 
Kathimerini, Ethnos, Eleftheros Typos, Epohi and Avgi), 12 national daily sports 
newspapers (including Sportday, Goal News, and Fos ton Sport), four national 
business newspapers (including Imerisia and Naftemporiki), 17 national Sunday 
papers (including To Vima, Proto Thema, Kathimerini tis Kyriakis, Real News, Ethnos 
tis Kyriakis, and Eleftheros Typos tis Kyriakis), and 11 national weekly papers 
(including Parapolitika and Sto Karfi), most of which are located in Athens 
(Papathanassopoulos 2014b). 
The market is nevertheless dominated by a handful of powerful newspaper interests 
which have expanded into electronic media following the liberalization and 
deregulation of the media market in the late 1980s (see below). As Table 1 shows, 
the most important publishing groups are Lambrakis Press SA (owner of TA NEA), 
Tegopoulos Publishing (owner of Eleftherotypia), Pegasus (Bobolas family) (owner of 
Ethnos), Press Institution SA (now D. Mpenekos and A. Skanavis) (owner of Eleftheros 
Typos), Alafouzos Family (owner of Kathimerini), Vradyni Ltd (K. Mitsis) (owner of 
Vradyni), SYRIZA–Left Coalition Party (owner of Avgi), and the Greek Communist 
Party (owner of Rizospastis).  
Lambrakis Press SA is a striking example of a diversified media company. In 1998, just 
before entering the Athens stock exchange, it employed 1,200 staff and consisted of 
15 companies, with the main activity being publishing (57.5 percent of total 
turnover), the printed press (29.2 percent) and tourism (13.3 percent). Following the 
stock exchange entry the company enjoyed profits and expanded into the electronic 
media domain (MEGA Channel). Its market capitalization in the period from 1998-
2008 was in the range of €260 ŵillioŶ to €308 million, well above its competitors 
(Leandros, 2008).  
The audiovisual landscape has undergone many upheavals since the late 1980s, 
when the market was liberalized and allowed the entry of private radio and 
television stations.
3
 From a state monopoly of radio and television a landscape of 
                                                          
3
 The key laws that liberalised the market, allowing the entry of private TV and radio are as follows: 
- Law 1730/1987 allowed private radio stations and paved the way for the end of state monopoly 
in television. 
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hundreds of private radio stations and tens of private television channels soon 
emerged through a savage deregulation process.  
The year 2013 proved to be dramatic for the Greek television landscape as it saw the 
sudden closure of the public service broadcaster ERT. Its three television channels 
(ET1, NET, and ET3), several radio stations and the online service were closed by 
ministerial decree. ERT was replaced by a new company dubbed NERIT, launched in 
May 2014 but not yet fully operational. This development has increased the 
domination of the television market by private channels. In 2013-2014, the saturated 
audiovisual market comprised NERIT, about 130 private television channels (among 
which the five most important national channels in terms of market share and 
advertising revenue were MEGA Channel, ANT1, ALPHA, STAR Channel, and SKAI TV), 
and more than 1,000 private radio stations with negligible market shares. MEGA is 
the most popular channel with a daily audience market share of 22.0 percent in 
2013, followed by ANT1 with a 17.3 percent audience share, ALPHA TV (12.4 
percent), STAR (11.1 percent) and SKAI (4.9 percent). ALTER television went bankrupt 
in 2012. It is worth noting that none of the private stations has a legal license 
because the temporary license status approved by NCRTV was ruled illegal by Council 
of State decision 3578/2010 (Michalitsis 2013). 
4
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
- Law 1866/1989 was the first step towards abolishing state monopoly by permitting local private 
TV channels and made provision for the establishment of an independent regulatory agency, the 
National Council of Radio and Television (NCRTV), to oversee the operation of broadcast media, 
grant licences to private stations, and supervise programs. 
- Law 2173/1993 allowed for the establishment of national private TV channels, therefore 
legitimising the stations that had already entered the market without a licence. 
- TodaǇ͛s ďasiĐ operatioŶal fraŵeǁork of private television media is defined by the Law 
2328/1995, in essence the first serious attempt to regulate the commercial broadcasting market 
effectively. The commercial stations are obliged to provide programs of high quality, objective 
information and news reports, and promote cultural diversity. 
- Law 2644/1998 made provision for the supply of broadcasting subscription services and 
regulated all new pay-TV services regardless of their process (digital or analogue) and means of 
broadcast (terrestrial, cable or satellite). Licenses are granted only to limited companies (S.A.) 
the shares of which should be restricted. In an attempt to prohibit the creation of dominant 
positions, the law made provisions for limitations of the holding of licenses, but these provisions 
were subsequently updated by Law 3592/2007 (see below). 
- Law 2863/2000 provided that NCRTV is an independent authority with sole responsibility for 
granting, renewing or revoking licenses for radio and TV services; practicing control on radio and 
TV services, both state and private, on whether they adhere to the relevant legislation; ensuring 
political and cultural diversity in mass media in cases where Laws 2328/1995 and 2644/1998 are 
breached; supervising free competition and market abuses in the media and communications 
industry (together with the HCC and the HTPC; imposing fines and administrative measures; 
examining requests for remedies for personal insults caused by mass media.  
-  Law 3592/2007 titled ͚New Act on Concentration and Licensing of Media Undertakings͛ , 
amended by 1688/135 (1 August 2014) provided for a number of issues, among them licensing 
for analog TV, DTT, and media concentration.  
4
 In 1989, when they first appeared, the private TV stations seized available frequencies and were 
subsequently granted temporary licenses without any competitive process. In 1999 and around 
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The levels of concentration of media ownership and cross-media concentration are 
high. This is because newspaper groups have diversified into electronic media, 
enabled by a weak and inconsistent regulatory framework. More specifically, the 
three largest press groups – Lambrakis Press SA, Tegopoulos Publishing, and Pegasus 
SA (Bobolas family) – are also shareholders of MEGA Channel, while Press Institution 
SA has shares in STAR Channel, and the Alafouzos family owns SKAI TV and several 
radio stations, such as SKAI FM and Melodia FM.  ANT1 and Macedonia TV are 
owned by M. Kyriakou (see Appendix 1).  
The rise of the internet has added an extra dimension; the highest visited websites 
are concentrated in large media groups, such as 24media
5
 and DPG, while the 
mainstream groups like DOL, Pegasus, and Mega Channel also have a strong 
presence (see Appendix 1).  
 
Regulation of Media Concentration 
 
Law 2328/1995 stipulated that a physical or legal person could hold only one 
broadcast license and up to 25 percent of the capital of the company, while 
ownership of more than one electronic media of the same type was prohibited. The 
same rules applied to relatives of physical persons to the fourth degree. Concerning 
cross-ŵedia oǁŶership, a ͚tǁo out of three͛ rule eǆisted, ŵeaŶiŶg that a siŶgle 
company or individual could not participate in more than two traditional media 
categories (television, radio or newspapers). The participation of non-Europeans in 
the shareholding of media companies was also limited to 25 percent of the capital 
(Terzis and Kontochristou, 2004).  
 
However, this strict regulatory framework did not prevent high levels of 
concentration of media ownership, as the control of electronic media by powerful 
publishing interests shows. Moreover, Law 3592/2007 titled New Act on 
Concentration and Licensing of Media Undertakings, passed by the Parliament in late 
2007, simplified rules and provided more opportunities for liberalization. It abolished 
older regulations such as that a company or a person could not hold more than 25 
percent of a television station, which had been contravened in practice anyway (by 
using surrogates or family members as nominal owners). In particular, Law 
3592/2007 provides that a legal entity can own one television station and have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2002/2003 attempts were made to hold a competition for granting licenses based on criteria such as 
technical sufficiency, economic sufficiency and viability through advertising. As no channels fulfilled 
these prerequisites, they exerted pressure and eventually had the competitions cancelled. 
Successive ministerial decisions by the PASOK and New Democracy governments have renewed the 
licences on a yearly basis (NM, interview). 
5
 24media is the largest digital publishing group, which manages over 20 premium content sites 
across internet and mobile platforms.  
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shares in (but not control) an additional one. Concerning cross-media ownership, the 
criteria for ŵeasuriŶg ĐoŶsolidatioŶ are the ĐoŵpaŶies͛ adǀertisiŶg eǆpeŶditure aŶd 
sales revenues. The new law introduced dominance thresholds ranging from 25 to 35 
per cent, depending on the number of media sector markets (i.e. the markets for 
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, online), in which the natural person or 
undertaking concerned is active.  
 
A recent amendment to the above Law (1688/135, passed on 1 August 2014 and 
envisaged for implementation on 1 July 2015) further liberalizes ownership and 
cross-media ownership. In particular, Article 2 (paragraph 1) allows partnerships 
between electronic media businesses (information or otherwise) of the same type 
(television, online, or radio) if they result in reduction of operating costs (for 
example, through economies of scale or joint utilization of financial resources). 
Article 2 (paragraph 5) discusses the term ͚common management͛, according to 
which the television or radio stations under common control will be able to share or 
exchange resources such as managers, equipment, technical and other facilities, to 
promote programs and services. August 2014 saw the adoption of Law 4279/2014, 
allowing partnerships between electronic media enterprises of the same kind, and 
the organisation, operation, and control of more than one media enterprise within a 
group through associated enterprises.  
 
The evolution of the legal framework indicates the government͛s clear intention to 
create large media conglomerates for economic viability, dating back to the 
Karamanlis era (2004-2009) (AN, interview). It is clear that these joint agreements for 
the production or use of content open Pandora's Box for mergers of large publishing 
groups such as Lambrakis SA and Pegasus SA. Another provision of Article 2 makes 
possible the conversion of information channels (television and radio) into non-
informative in order to cut costs. Article 3 (paragraph 8) clarifies the nature of non-
information resources, which may be of general targeting (e.g. drama and general 
entertainment), or specific targeting (e.g. music, sports broadcasts, documentaries). 
Article 3 (paragraph 10) states that announcements by the broadcaster to promote 
their own programs and ancillary products may not exceed four minutes per 
hour. But advertising executives believe this may result in unfair competition, since it 
strengthens the position of major publishing groups that have shareholder 
relationship with television channels, at the expense of those that do not. Ultimately, 
this has an impact on freedom of the press and pluralism of the media, as the smaller 
publishing groups are further disadvantaged in the current economic climate. 
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Concerning compliance with the above rules, the responsible authority is the NCRTV. 
The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC)
6
 also has a supervisory role; it can 
request the assistance of the HTPC, where deemed necessary.
7
 
 
Ownership transparency and access to information 
Article 14 (9) of the Constitution affirms the importance of ensuring transparency 
and pluralism of information across the media and in the workings of the media 
industry. A number of measures have been adopted in recent years to increase 
transparency in the media. The Secretariat General of Mass Media, a government 
body (see http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/), tracks the allocation of state 
subsidies and other support tools aimed at the media, including public sector 
advertising that is channelled to specific outlets and the amount of total press 
distribution and telecommunications subsidies; more specifically, it publishes on its 
site:  
 Approved programs and management accounts of the advertising expenditure 
of public bodies.  Procurement of all services related to the supply of goods and services, 
according to Pat. 4851 / 22.02.2008 Circular of the Ministry of the Interior. 
 All information concerning government grants to the press. 
                                                          
6
 The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) was set up in 1977, but was only given independent 
status in 1995. The HCC guarantees the open operation of the market and applies the competition 
law, the principal source of which is Law 703/1977, as amended by Law 3373/2005. The HCC consists 
of a president and eight full-time board members. In contrast to NCRTV, whose independence is 
compromised by its appointment structure, it functions independently of political and economic 
interests.  
  
7
 The Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (HTPC) is an independent administrative 
authority that regulates, supervises, and monitors the electronic communications and postal 
services market in Greece. According to article 12 of Law 3431/2006, the HTPC regulates issues 
relating to: the definition of relevant markets, products, or electronic communications services; and 
the assignment and obligations of operators with significant market power in the above-mentioned 
markets in accordance with national and EU legislation. Moreover, the HTPC is responsible for 
applying Law 703/1977 on the control of monopolies and oligopolies and the protection of free 
competition. This law was amended by Law 3373/2005 to incorporate the EC provision on pre-
notification of mergers. It also incorporates Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty in accordance with 
Council Regulation 1/2003, in relation to the activities of electronic communication undertakings. 
The HTPC consists of nine members, including the President and two Vice Presidents responsible for 
the sectors of Electronic Communications and Postal Services respectively. According to Law 
3371/2005, the president and vice presidents are appointed by the Council of Ministers, upon 
proposal by the Minister of Transport and Communications following the opinion of the Special 
Permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency of the Parliament. The HTPC's other six 
members are appointed by the Minister of Transport and Communications. Similarly to the HCC, it is 
a strong regulatory body that functions independently.  
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 All information relating to the movement of the postal press. 
 Names of staff at the Secretariat General of Communication and Information 
together with the Directorates and Departments that employ them.  
Such information is, however, not always comprehensive or regularly updated 
(Psychogiopoulou et al., 2011). Concerning the electronic media, the regulatory 
agency NCRTV publishes all licensed radio and television outlets on its website 
(www.esr.gr) mentioning the company name, contact details, and the scope of the 
outlet͛s territorial Đoǀerage ;ŶatioŶal, regioŶal/loĐal). A comprehensive regulatory 
framework for online media has yet to be developed. NCRTV is also charged with 
keeping record and shareholder information of media and media-related enterprises 
including press agencies, advertising and media research companies (see Art. 10a 
PresideŶtial deĐree ;PDͿ Ϯϭϯ/ϭϵϵϱ ;FEK Α͛ ϭϭϮ/ϭϵϵϱͿ aŶd Art. ϭϬ Laǁ ϯϯϭϬ/ϮϬϬϱ ;FEK 
A͛ ϯϬ/ϮϬϬϱͿ as aŵeŶded ďǇ Laǁ ϯϰϭϰ/ϮϬϬϱ ;FEK A͛ Ϯϳϵ/ϮϬϬϱͿ.  
 
While this information is accessible to the public through the authoritǇ͛s ǁeďsite, 
there is no data on the degree to which people are actually aware of it or the 
percentage of the population actually accessing it. Art. 6 of PD 109/2010 (which 
incorporated the EU Audio Visual Media Services Directive as statute) also contains 
rules that cater for increased transparency in the audiovisual media sector by 
mandating audiovisual media service providers to make their company name, 
address and contact details publicly available through their website or teletext 
service. Press undertakings are required to list the name(s) of their owner (physical 
or legal person), publisher and manager in their edition (see Art. 3 Law 1178/1981, 
FEK A͛ ϭϴϳ/ϭϵϴϭͿ. 
Finally, the principle of transparency in all areas of public life, including the media, is 
expected to increase given that an Action Plan to promote Open Government (Greek 
Action Plan 2014-16) is now in place.
8
 
 
How ownership is considered to affect journalism 
 
At the macro level, ownership affects journalism in ways that are linked with the 
current financial crisis. Since there have been many mergers and acquisitions among 
                                                          
8
 Technical and institutional changes have been adopted to enhance transparency and the 
functionality of the DIAVGEIA (͚traŶspareŶĐǇ͛ iŶ GreekͿ project, the publication of public tenders, 
and the open, transparent and secure exchange of public documents. In the present action plan, the 
major challenges in the effort to enhance transparency concern the institutional and technological 
upgrading of the DIAVGEIA Programme, the publication of all open invitations for job vacancies in 
the public sector, as well as of public administration organizational charts. The Action Plan also 
aspires to improve the coordination and monitoring of Open Government policy, the reorganization 
of inspectorate bodies, and the development of a strategy against corruption.  
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media companies, it has become difficult for journalists to find jobs when they are 
made redundant by a particular media institution, either because it closed down or 
because there were differences of opinion with the owner.  
 
In addition, the financial crisis, together with the tough fiscal austerity measures – 
including heavy reductions in salaries and pensions and numerous layoffs in the 
public sector – have accelerated the downward trend in newspaper circulation. This 
has had an impact on the employment of media personnel in general and print 
journalists in particular. More than 20 per cent of JUADN members are estimated to 
be unemployed, while about 30 percent have temporarily interrupted work as they 
do not get paid (MK, interview). The national collective agreement currently 
determines a monthly salarǇ of €ϱϴϭ gross ;€ϰϵϬ gross for those Ϯϱ Ǉears age or 
less). The informal economy has grown because of austerity and journalists are 
compelled to work by piece and with any conditions that the employer decides (DT, 
interview).  
 
The closure of particular media organizations has been devastating. The shutting 
down of ALTER television led to about 800 redundancies, including journalists. The 
closure of three public television channels and several public radio stations in 2013 
led to the layoff of about 2,700 permanent and 300 temporary employees. In the 
case of Imerisia newspaper (which belongs to Pegasus SA, one of the big media 
organizations), of 150 personnel in 2011 fewer than 30 remained in 2013. In the 
entire Pegasus SA (which also comprises the Ethnos newspaper) there are 430 left of 
1,500. At the same time, salaries have been reduced by 60 percent (XS, interview).  
 
Media dependencies on state funding, advertising and economic 
interests 
The State, media and clientelism 
The overt and covert use of public money to support preferred media outlets is 
widespread in south-eastern Europe. The state in Greece has historically intervened 
in all aspects of economic and social life, including the media. The interventionist 
state has played the following roles:  censor (the direct authoritarian control exercised during the dictatorship of 
1967-74 has carried over into the democratic period).  owner (the electronic media have typically been under tight state control)  subsidiser (several press outlets became dependent).  
The intertwining of political elites and the media has resulted in a highly centralized 
state policy. In effect, this led to a journalistic culture which has historically been 
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cautious about reporting news that could be embarrassing to state officials (Hallin 
and Papathannassopoulos, 2002; Papathannassopoulos, 2014b). This process is 
widely referred to as clientelism (a pattern of social organization in which access to 
social resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for 
deference and various types of support). Clientelistic relationships are far from being 
unique to Greece; they have been central to the social and political organization of 
most southern European contexts due to the late development of democracy and 
the historical prevalence of autocratic institutions.  
 
State interference into the Press 
The modernization of the Greek press since the fall of the military junta in 1974, was 
enabled by the introduction of new printing technologies, the entry of private 
investors, and the fierce competition from television. The sector has witnessed the 
entry of industrialists (especially from the construction sector) and ship-owners, all 
trying to benefit their business interests by influencing public opinion and politicians 
(Leandros, 2010). Nevertheless, the ongoing fiscal crisis has accelerated the decline 
of circulation and caused major losses of advertising revenue. Meanwhile, state 
subsidies for the press have been reduced as part of public spending cuts. 
To be sure, state aid for newspapers in Greece was established as an economic 
intervention with strong political repercussions on both politics and the press. There 
are no clear rules applying to state aid, though a ͞Bureau of NeǁspriŶt͟ ǁas set up as 
early as in 1946 to establish criteria for the allocation of newsprint subsidies. In the 
era of restoration of Parliament (1974-1990), the state used subsidies to enforce 
written press limits by providing sizeable financial aid to the press, on which 
individual enterprises became dependent since they could not recover their 
production costs by themselves. The Greek model of state aid to newspapers in 
1995–2008 may be summarised as follows: 
 
•  State assistance for the transportation of newspapers by air and railways. For 
example, in 2007 this aid cost the state some €7.5 million.  
 
•  Financial support in the form of subsidizing distribution costs given to the Greek 
press to help sales abroad, mainly to push readership in the Greek diaspora. For 
example, in 2007 the government spent €800,000 to assist air transportation of 
Greek newspapers to the United States and Northern Europe; however, this 
subsidy was abolished in 2012 (Papathanassopoulos, 2014b: 245-8).  
 
Whereas press subsidies do not necessarily result in government control over 
newspaper output (Sparks, 1992), government intervention in the Greek press has 
the following characteristics: 
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 Press subsidies have not been governed by a clear and transparent regulatory 
framework. Rather, they constituted an expression of a paternalistic and 
clientelistic political culture that has tied together the state and the press in a 
network of mutual benefits. The state largely defined the extent of autonomy it 
was willing to grant to the press and used press subsidies to make individual 
press enterprises dependent as the latter could not afford the production and 
distribution costs (see above).   There has been no transparent and regular financial press subsidy scheme, and 
most newspapers have become dependent on irregular direct government 
financial support as well as on bank loans.   Indirect subsidies such as government advertising and reduced tariffs on 
telephone and air transport have been abolished or drastically cut since July 
2011 (see table below). The entire state advertising expenses in 2008, including 
ministries, municipalities, public enterprises, lottery games administered by the 
Greek Organisation of Football Prognostics S.A. (OPAP), came to a staggering 
€105.7 million; in 2011 the figure was €34.3 million, while in 2012 it was €29.3 
million. Significantly, a big share in these figures is taken by OPAP (€33.7 million 
in 2008, €17.9 in 2011, and €14.5 million in 2012). Its privatization in 2013 was 
seen as a further step in intertwinement between media and private interests, 
as OPAP is one of the strongest clients in advertising (Ntarzanou, 2013). 
 
Public Aid to the Greek Press 2009-ϮϬϭϮ ;€ ŵillioŶͿ  
Year Postage Telephones Air transport 
in Greece 
Air transport 
outside Greece 
2009 32.7 0.77 5.48 0.62 
2010 27.8 0.65 5.95 0.47 
2011 16.9 0.31 1.79 0.16 
2012 5.7 (estimate) Abolished Abolished Abolished  Source: Secretariat General of Mass Media; Papathanassopoulos, 2014b 
It seems surprising that state advertising in 2013 (first ten months) increased to 
€34.7 million, compared to €23.2 million in the first ten months of 2012, though the 
2013 figure does not include OPAP; for some, less so, as it is attributed to a pressing 
need to ensure that media corporations continue to present a favorable angle of 
government policy under austerity.
9
  
If non-state sources are taken into account, advertising expenditure in 2011 in both 
print and electronic media went down to just €1.6 billion, compared to €2.6 billion in 
2007 (a reduction of more than 40 percent in just four years). This also reflects the 
weaknesses of the media sector relating to production procedures, the quality of the 
                                                          
9
 See http://greektv-com.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/blog-post_7811.html. 
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serǀiĐe, as ǁell as the ŵedia͛s relatioŶship with their audiences (Leandros, 2013).10 
Generally speaking, due to the dependency of media on state (and banking) 
advertising, falls in advertising spending are likely to result in bankruptcy for most of 
the current titles, both at a national and regional level, thereby adding to the already 
high number of unemployed press journalists. 
 
ǮDiaplokiǯ and the triangle of power 
The ͚goldeŶ age͛ of the Greek ŵedia (1980s and 1990s), generated large media 
organisations characterised by diversification, high production costs, and, more 
worryingly, to the establishment of close ties between the media and the political 
elite. These were consolidated over time by the increasing concentration of media 
market power, economic activities of media moguls in various sectors (e.g. shipping, 
telecommunications, refining, construction, or sports), and their engagement in 
business with state mechanisms.  
The outcome has been a rich landscape of deep intertwinement of interests (the so-
called diaploki) through advertising and commissioning of public projects: 
͞Traditional newspaper owners used to be politically affiliated and not necessarily 
objective and they did try to control the political process, but at least they did not 
have intertwining interests and other activities. The media have been colonized since 
the 1980s by entrepreneurs undertaking public projects, who realised that 
controlling the media would give them control of information͟ ;LH, interview). 
In effect, a so-Đalled ͚triaŶgle of poǁer͛, involving political power-holders, media 
organizations and powerful economic actors, including banks, has been well-
established and quite visible. Many of our interviewees emphasized how this triangle 
operates. The heart of the problem is that those who own the largest media 
corporations also hold leadership positions in significant economic sectors. The 
problem becomes more significant when we take into account that due to the 
structure of the Greek economy, their economic activities (oil, shipping, construction 
and so on) depend largely on the state, i.e. they involve public projects. As a result, 
when part of this activity is not lawful or involves preferential treatment or clientelist 
relations, it is in the interest of these entrepreneurs not to provide objective and 
transparent information in the media outlets that they control (NL, LH, KV, 
interviews).
11
  
                                                          
10
 Having said this, advertising has not always been proportionate to readership; there are examples 
of outlets with low levels of audience which have nevertheless attracted significant advertising 
revenue, e.g. the newspaper Hora. 
11
 An example before the crisis was the media coverage of the period running up to the 2004 
Olympic Games in Athens. As most of the powerful media owners were involved in public projects 
related to the Games, there was an information deficit regarding the allocation and budgets of such 
projects (NL, interview).  
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While the declared priority of Greek media policy reform has been the fight against 
diaploki, alongside ensuring transparency of media ownership, successive 
governments have in practice tended to exploit these relationships to their own 
advantage, demonstrating a lack of the political will needed to combat powerful 
business and media interests. In the recent years of austerity, the small group of 
oligarchs who own the major newspapers and engage in economic activities involving 
public projects have tended to present a favourable picture of government policy 
through their media outlets. At the same time, the presence of the banks in the 
triangle has become increasingly influential. Banks invest huge sums in advertising 
through the press, television and radio, while the banking system is intertwined with 
extensive political interests, particularly under the circumstances of the 
͚MeŵoraŶduŵ͛ imposed on Greece by the Troika (European Central Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and European Union through the European 
Commission).12 
 
How media dependencies are considered to affect journalism  
In general terms, clientelism affects the development of news media in several ways 
(Hallin and Papathannassopoulos, 2002; Hallin and Mancini, 2004):   it encourages the use of the media for purposes other than the balanced 
provision of news and current affairs  it weakens self-regulation of the media and jeopardizes the political and 
economic independence of regulatory agencies  it affects media content, particularly in newspapers, by treating it as currency 
for negotiation among conflicting elites, rather than as a means of informing 
the public.  
Societies where political clientelism is historically prevalent have difficulty in 
developing a seŶse of a ͚puďliĐ iŶterest͛ as agaiŶst partiĐular priǀate iŶterests; as a 
result, political pluralism suffers. In general, clientelism contributes to the difficulty 
of developing a culture of journalistic professionalism (Papathanassopoulos, 2014b).     
In Greece, the domination of private media and the increasing presence of 
advertising (at least before the crisis) have contributed to a gradual deterioration of 
media output towards the direction of infotainment and low quality programs. The 
invasion of advertising has influenced news in ways favorable for those advertised. 
 
The triangle of power has been identified as a central problem in the functioning of 
media in our interviews (KV, NL, LH, DT, interviews). Under austerity, and taking into 
                                                          
12
 For instance, the Piraeus Bank has controversially absorbed a number of other banks in recent 
Ǉears, ǁhile the eǆeĐutiǀe ĐhairŵaŶ͛s family has been accused of linking the bank͛s activities with 
their offshore companies. The mainstream media have not covered these practices, as Piraeus Bank 
is one of the biggest advertisers in almost all of them.  
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consideration that media organizations are heavily indebted,
13
 the triangle between 
media, the political system, and the economic system (including large banks, which 
are managed by private interests) has become tighter. Media organisations are 
increasingly dependent on public contracts and the banking system (through loans or 
advertising revenue) for their survival.
14
 This means that they are very careful in 
controlling the content they publish or broadcast. In parallel, since austerity started 
Greece has experienced significant layoffs in the media sector in total, while many 
surviving employees face lower salaries and worse conditions: ͞We haǀe thus a 
terrorised group of media producers compelled to work for media owners who are 
increasingly identified with the dominant ecoŶoŵiĐ aŶd politiĐal iŶterests͟ (DT, 
interview). 
Media owner Ioannis Alafouzos, who owns SKAI TV and Kathimerini, for instance, has 
ĐharaĐterised ŵedia as "iŶ effeĐt press offiĐes for ďusiŶess groups…It has developed 
into a completely unhealthy situation. The purpose of media has been largely to 
execute specific tasks for their owners" (Reuters, 2012a). Expressions of this are, for 
example, presenting the government positively in exchange for the passage of a 
favourable law for facilitating the economic interests of the media organization in 
question; or Ŷot disĐlosiŶg a ĐertaiŶ ďaŶk͛s uŶlaǁful praĐtiĐes or its liŶks ǁith other 
(possibly unlawful) activities in exchange for getting a loan. It can also take the form 
of blackmailing the government, exerting pressures in particular entrepreneurial 
directions, aŶd threateŶiŶg to tarŶish the goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s piĐture should these 
entrepreneurial interests not be satisfied (NM, interview).  
 
The intertwining of media, economic, and political interests has created an 
impenetrable web of corruption and silence (KV interview).
15
 Under these 
circumstances, certain issues will be covered minimally, if at all, when the economic 
iŶterests of ŵaiŶstreaŵ ŵedia oǁŶers are iŵpliĐated. The ͚“kouries͛ affair is 
indicative, as it involved economic interests that were common with the ownership 
of Pegasus SA, therefore it was not covered by the media (AN interview).
16
 The 
recent disclosure of the Lux Leaks affair is also significant. This concerned tax 
avoidance by large firms in Luxemburg and involved a small number of influential 
Greek firms. Although a reporter for TA NEA newspaper had been given exclusivity by 
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIG) for presenting the 
                                                          
13
 According to a study of recently-published accounts, the top 18 Athens-based media companies 
had declared debts of more than €2 billion in total (Reuters, 2012a). 
14
  Though they are indebted, media are among the very few corporations that get loans, e.g. a 2013 
loan of €98 million to MEGA channel from the National Bank of Greece. 
15
 As an example, Eleftherotypia͛s well-known column ͚Ios͛ ceased publication in 2010, after 20 years, 
allegedly as a result of the newspaper͛s switch towards support of austerity policies. 
16
 The gold-mining operations in the area of Skouries in Chalkidiki (northern Greece), were met in 
2013 with protests by local residents on the grounds of their environmental impact. The police 
intervened against protesters and Amnesty International called for the Greek authorities to 
investigate alleged human rights violations by the police.  
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case in Greece, he was forced by his superiors to not publish the names of the Greek 
corporations involved, as some of these had common interests with the very 
newspaper he was reporting for; in effect, TA NEA chose to censor itself (NM, NL, TT 
interviews).
17
 
 
Advertising is carried out through media shops, which are intermediaries between 
the firm advertised and the media outlet hosting the advertisement; they manage 
contracts between the two parties, which often involve clauses that enable the firm 
to control the content of the outlet hosting the advertisement. This control is often 
suffocating, particularly when banks are advertised (LH, NM, interviews). 
Hoǁeǀer, there are eǆĐeptioŶs: ͞MǇ experience from my newspaper is not one of 
interference. When I covered a difficult economic subject last year, namely the 
restructuring of fish farming debts, banks were involved, including lenders of the 
media group where my newspaper belongs. I was just told to be fair, which I would 
have been anyway. The report was broadcast and neither the banks nor the fish 
farming company were happy͟ (TT, interview). On certain occasions the prerogative 
of silencing or avoiding sensitive issues is dictated by more mundane considerations 
than by pressure from powerful economic and political interests. From the 
perspective of newspapers with (for the most part) weak and under-resourced legal 
departments, it is important to try and avoid lawsuits.  
Intertwining and conflicting interests are also evident in the way the crisis is 
presented in the mainstream media: ͞The mainstream media have adopted uniform 
ways of presenting the crisis: cultivation of fear as to what might happen, which 
directs people to adopt conservative decisions; cultivation of a guilt syndrome, 
suggesting that citizens are the culprits of the situation the country is in; defamation 
of certain economic guilds and associations; and last but not least, silencing of 
reactions, resistance and mobilisation͟ (AN, interview). Dependence on advertising, 
particularly through banks, means compliance with a positive representation of the 
government and the policies of the Troika.  
The closure of the public broadcaster ERT 
In 2013 the government closed down the national public broadcaster, ERT, and made 
its employees redundant, ostensibly as part of the latest public spending cuts 
iŵposed to ŵeet the terŵs of the ĐouŶtrǇ͛s ďailout deal with the European Union.  
                                                          
17
 Interestingly, The Guardian newspaper, whose proprietor, the Guardian Media Group was also 
involved in the tax avoidance schemes, did not hesitate to publish the piece and mention its owner 
firm. In Greece, the Press Project group gave extensive coverage to the scandal and also carried out 
research into how it was covered by the Greek media. This research found very little front-page 
coverage of the issue in the mainstream press, including the papers of the political left (NL, 
interview). 
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Looking back at the history of ERT, Law 1730/1987 united public television into a 
single corporate body titled ERT S.A. (Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation). As 
stipulated by law, the mission of ERT S.A. was the organization, exploitation and 
development of state broadcasting, its contribution to public education and 
entertainment, as well as the presentation of the activities of the Greek Parliament. 
It was further provided that state radio and television should reach diverse social 
groups and cover a wide range of fields, since their purpose was not to make profits 
but to promote the public interest.  
In the case of broadcasting the state not only intervenes but is the active agent. 
Greek broadcasting was established, as in most European countries, as a state 
monopoly which remained after the restoration of Parliament. According to the 
CoŶstitutioŶ of ϭϵϳϱ, ͚radio aŶd teleǀisioŶ ǁill be under the direct control of the 
state͛ ;Aliǀizatos, ϭϵϴϲ; Dagtoglou, ϭϵϴϵͿ. Although ͚direĐt ĐoŶtrol͛ did Ŷot 
ŶeĐessarilǇ ŵeaŶ ͚state ŵoŶopolǇ͛, state ŵoŶopolǇ ǁas justified oŶ the grouŶds of 
the limited frequencies being available, as well as the need to provide full coverage 
for such a mountainous country with its many islands. Therefore, the state became 
the sole agent of the broadcast media. The government manipulation of state 
television news output is a suitable example of the dirigist role of the state, since it 
has traditionally reflected and reinforced government views and policies 
(Papathanassopoulos, 1990). 
As a result, ministerial censorship was common practice and state control greater 
than was the case elsewhere. The general pattern at the Greek state broadcaster was 
that a transfer of political power was followed by an equivalent turnover among the 
executives. As a result, news and editorial judgments of particular importance were 
in close agreement with, if not identical to, the government announcements on a 
whole range of policies and decisions. Thus, it is not surprising that the responsible 
posts in state broadcasting have come and gone with great frequency, and when the 
major political parties, New Democracy (Conservatives) and PASOK (Socialists), come 
to power they usually adopt policies they had strongly criticized when they were in 
the Opposition (ibid.).  
In this sense, it could be said that public service broadcasting never really existed in 
Greece. The troubled political history of the country led to the formation of a ͚state͛ 
rather thaŶ a ͚puďliĐ͛ ďroadĐaster. To uŶderstaŶd this, oŶe has also to note that the 
license fee is not collected directly from the television-owning households, but 
through the electricity bills. In this sense there was never a license fee of the 
Western European kind. By and large, in Greece the public broadcaster was unable to 
function according to the public service obligations evident in Britain, Germany, 
Scandinavia or other Northern European countries (Iosifidis, 2011; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2010). 
The deregulation of broadcasting in the late 1980s and 1990s and the entry of big 
industrial and merchant capital into the Greek media ecology had impacted greatly 
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on ERT which never recovered from huge losses of audience share and advertising 
revenue. For many analysts, ERT lacked clear public interest objectives, while it was 
bureaucratically run, and its political independence was questionable. It was also 
criticised for being overstaffed, loss-making, and unaccountable to the public. These 
were some of the arguments used on 11 June 2013 by the government spokesman to 
justify the closure.  
Ironically, as Nevradakis (2013) notes, many of the criticisms levelled against ERT 
following the shutdown are less applicable to ERT than to the major private media 
outlets. According to its own figures, in 2011 ERT had pre-tax profits of €56.9 million, 
while in 2012, that figure was €36 million, so the portrayal of it as loss-making was a 
myth; moreover, it was not funded from the national budget but from a license fee 
levied on electricity bills. In fact, the licence fee was one of the lowest in Europe and 
25 percent of it did not go to ERT at all ďut to a ͚greeŶ eŶergǇ͛ fuŶd to promote 
renewable energy sources, which jeopardized ERT͛s financial independence. On the 
other haŶd, the ͚highlǇ paid͛ eŵploǇees of E‘T represeŶted a sŵall ŵiŶority of the 
organizatioŶ͛s ǁorkforĐe aŶd ǁere ŵostlǇ direĐt goǀerŶŵeŶt appoiŶtŵeŶts ;soŵe 
under the current New Democracy-PASOK governing coalition, which closed down 
ERT in the name of transparency and meritocracy).
18
 As a PSB, ERT provided a 
universal service (including radio and television coverage in remote regions), while it 
was the only broadcaster in Greece that operated worldwide satellite and shortwave 
services for the Greek diaspora, as well as radio stations featuring classical music, 
world music and broadcasts in foreign languages for immigrants in Greece 
(Nevradakis, 2013). 
The real motives behind the closure involved the need to control a public 
broadcaster that was showing signs of independence – and criticizing the 
government – while also blocking increasing collective action by the employees (MK, 
interview). In addition, as many interviewees have affirmed, by closing down ERT the 
government and private interests succeeded in gaining full control of the digital 
television landscape and preventing ERT (the representative of the public interest) 
from raising objections to the terms attached to the competition for digital spectrum 
and the way it was conducted (NM, GD, MN, KV, AT, DT, interviews). 
The abrupt closure of ERT has been widely condemned by national, European and 
international organizations, including the Council of Europe, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Parliament and media 
organizations (Economou, 2013). The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the 
association of European public service broadcasters of which ERT is a founding  
member, urged the Greek Prime Minister, A. Samaras, to reverse the decision. 
Instead, the ruling coalition of New Democracy and PASOK passed a bill – by a 
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 A small number of special consultants (19 people), hired by the ND/PASOK coalition, were paid the 
equivalent of 350 journalists͛ salaries. 
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narrow majority of 155 votes in the 300-seat house – to establish New Hellenic 
Radio, Internet and Television (NERIT) to replace ERT.  
Meanwhile, a number of experts have questioned the legalitǇ of E‘T͛s shutdoǁŶ, on 
the grounds that Article 44 of the Constitution requires ministerial decrees to be 
approved by parliament within 40 days, something that did not happen in this case. 
Indeed, a subsequent ruling by the Council of State determined that the closure was 
illegal.  Under EU Law, even though PSB is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, 
the 1997 Amsterdam Protocol recognizes the importance of PSB for the democratic, 
social and cultural needs of each society and for media pluralism. Further, a 2009 
study on media pluralism commissioned by the EC recognized that public service 
media are a cornerstone of democracy and identified the lack or insufficiency of 
funding as one of the main threats to them from a legal/regulatory perspective (EC, 
2009).  
 
How ERTǯs closure affected journalism and the media industry 
The shutdown of ERT left the broadcasting landscape without a public channel and 
made Greek citizens dependent on private media for the provision of information, 
entertainment and education (Iosifidis & Katsirea, 2014). While ERT was historically 
subject to government influence and control, it did occasionally present instances of 
criticism against government policy. In the period 2010-12 in particular (under G. 
Papandreou͛s government), ERT was able to operate with relative independence and 
expression of opinion on air, together with relatively high audience shares. The 
atmosphere changed dramatically, however, after the 2012 elections, and a number 
of incidents demonstrated a clear intention for government intervention and 
censorship, culminating in its closure in June 2013 (MK, MN, interviews).
19
 
The audiovisual landscape since ERT͛s Đlosure ĐertaiŶlǇ suffers froŵ a ͚pluralisŵ 
defiĐit͛; ERT was the only broadcaster with a legal obligation to provide objective, 
unbiased news in a market dominated by largely unlicensed commercial channels. 
GreeĐe͛s drop ďǇ ϭϰ plaĐes to ϵϵth plaĐe out of ϭϴϬ ĐouŶtries in the 2014 World 
Press Freedom Index, just one place above Bulgaria, the lowest ranked EU country, is 
an unmistakable sign that media freedom and pluralism have deteriorated since 
E‘T͛s Đlosure, ǁhiĐh ǁas ĐharaĐterized as ͚a turŶiŶg poiŶt iŶ GreeĐe͛s ŵedia historǇ͛ 
(Reporters without Borders, 2014). 
Despite serious pitfalls, such as editorial dependence and excessive pay for senior 
personnel, as well as mechanisms of self-remuneration and corruption, E‘T͛s aďrupt 
closure without consultation was an attack on free speech, public space, and cultural 
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 One such well-known incident involved a morning television program with high audience share, 
which was initially cut from four to two hours and was eventually suspended altogether after 
negative remarks were made on-air about a minister (MK, interview).  
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heritage. The goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s authoritariaŶ move was a blow to Greek democracy, 
since E‘T͛s legaĐǇ was sacrificed under the pretence of financial expediency. Even 
more worryingly, it is a dangerous precedent to close down PSB entirely or even to 
link PSB reform to austerity. Greece is not the only country undergoing austerity 
measures and looking to cut public spending; even though some slimming of budgets 
might be unavoidable, the position of public service broadcasting in these conditions 
should be guaranteed and such arbitrary axing should be prohibited (Iosifidis & 
Katsirea, 2014). The implications for pluralism are obvious and acutely relevant in 
view of the program strands affected (including culture) and of the diversity of the 
audience (including immigrants in Greece and Greeks abroad) (LN, interview). It is 
worth noting that the opposition party of the Left (SYRIZA) has pledged to re-open 
ERT should they form the next government after the 25 January 2015 elections.  
As mentioned, ERT was replaced by NERIT, whose independence is questionable for 
several reasons:   NERIT is tainted by its origins and is not recognised by the political opposition.  Although it was established as an independent public television, a subsequent 
legal amendment determined that the relevant Minister will be the main 
player in selecting the Board Director and the Board, thereby ensuring state 
control of NERIT.  The government-orĐhestrated appoiŶtŵeŶt of NE‘IT͛s keǇ persoŶŶel not only 
violates equal opportunities and meritocracy but also undermines the effort 
to eŶhaŶĐe the ĐhaŶŶel͛s editorial iŶtegritǇ.  NERIT co-exists with a social movement of ex-ERT employees (and others) who 
support the re-opening of ERT and currently use some of ERT͛s equipment to 
produce significant news, as well as other content. 
The shutdown, then, contributed to a deteriorating landscape regarding the overall 
quality of journalistic independence, media performance and plurality of output. The 
dismissal of some 2,700 permanent and some 300 temporary employees without 
consultation has led the vast majority of them to stay out of the market or seek work 
in private media under worse conditions: ͞The priǀate ŵedia are Đompletely 
controlled, much more than ERT used to be. It is humiliating for the journalists. I 
have seen journalists who report live and they read whatever their editor has already 
given them beforehand. Many rely only on press releases, or even worse, on the so-
Đalled ͚non-papers͛, ǁhiĐh proǀide iŶforŵatioŶ in the understanding that the source 
carries no responsibility for it. Lack of funding has shrunk specialized reporting. 
Newspapers still have their own expert journalists, but radio and television use the 
same personnel for coverage of different topics; thus, a journalist reports on 
insurance one day, on education the following and on health on the third, and as a 
result cannot become knowledgeable and take a stance on any subject͟ (MN, 
interview).  
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Digital switchover of broadcasting 
Regulatory framework 
In terms of regulation, according to Law 2863/2000 the regulatory agency NCRTV has 
the sole responsibility for granting, renewing or revoking licenses for terrestrial 
transmission of broadcasting services. 
 
Law 2644/1998 made provision for the supply of broadcasting subscription services 
and regulated all new pay-TV services regardless of their process (digital or analog) 
and means of broadcast (terrestrial, cable or satellite). Licenses are granted only to 
limited liability companies (S.A.), the shares of which should be registered. In an 
attempt to prohibit the creation of dominant positions, the law provides for 
limitations of the holding of licenses, but these provisions were subsequently 
updated and replaced by Law 3592/2007. 
 
Law 3592/2007 made it possible for licensed television stations to transmit digitally 
their analog Television program using frequencies that would be allocated for the 
period until the digital switchover. According to the 2007 Law, the responsibilities of 
the Ministry of Infrastructures, Transport and Networks and the Ministry of Press 
and the Media are (1) to establish the regulatory framework for digital licensing; (2) 
to create the frequency map and establish the technical requirements, and (3) to 
grant the licences. With regard to the regulatory bodies, the Law foresees that the 
broadcasting regulator (NCRTV) is responsible for granting licences and checking 
compliance with the relevant legislation regarding content. The telecommunications 
regulatory body (HTPC) is responsible for checking the incumbents for compliance 
with the technical requirements. In addition, Law 3592/2007 contains provisions on 
the implementation of the Electronic Communications Services and Networks 
Directive 2002/77/EC, as well as on television via broadband networks (IPTV) and 
wireless networks (mobile television). 
 
The plan for analog switch-off 
Greece lags behind other European countries when it comes to digital switch-over. It 
was among the countries that could not meet the 2012 analog switch-off deadline 
suggested by the European Commission. However, since the mid-2014 the 
progression to digital switchover has accelerated and analog switch-off has occurred 
in the following regions: 
27 June 2014: Peloponnese; part of Central Greece; part of the island of Zakynthos.  
1 August 2014: Attica; Argosaronikos Gulf (islands of Poros, Aegina, Salamina, 
Angistri, Hydra and Spetses); Central and South Euboia; Northwest of the Cyclades 
group of islands. 
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5 September 2014: Northeastern Greece and islands of Northeastern Aegean (Chios, 
Lesbos, Limnos). 
Meanwhile, two co-ministerial decisions were published containing the date of the 
definitive national switch-off of analog signals (19 December 2014) and the dates of 
switch-off throughout the country. These dates for switchover were decided after 
public consultation organized by the telecoms regulator, NTPC.  
The next three major analog switch-off stages were scheduled as follows: 
31 October 2014: Central Macedonia; Thessaly; part of Central Greece. 
28 November 2014: Epirus; West Macedonia; Ionian islands; Aetolia-Acarnania.  
19 December 2014: Crete; rest of the Cyclades islands; the Dodecanese islands; 
Samos and Ikaria. 
It was foreseen that from 19 December 2014 about 96 percent of the population 
would receive digital signal only, making the Greek switch-over one of the most 
compressed in Europe. But this deadline was never met and the final conversion date 
has now been moved to 6 February 2015. It is doubtful that this new date will be 
met, given that the country will hold a general election on 25 January 2015 and 
political priorities obviously rest elsewhere. 
 
 
The Digea involvement 
 
Similarly to the development of digital satellite television, which was left entirely to 
the private sector, the government has promoted private interests in digital 
terrestrial television (DTT).  While ERT was used to drive the development of DTT in 
the beginning, (it was the first to broadcast digitally in 2006) its sudden closure left 
the terrain open for private television interests to dominate (Papathanassopoulos, 
2014a). After June 2013, ERT could not participate in the digital frequencies 
allocation, not could it have an input (as the representative of public interest) in the 
relevant competition for the allocation of digital frequencies, which was at the time 
unfolding (NM, interview).   
 
In July 2009, Digea Digital Provider S.A was officially named by the Government as 
the DTT network provider for the main Greek private television channels with 
national coverage (MEGA, ANT1, ALPHA, STAR, and SKAI). Digea͛s ŵaiŶ aĐtiǀitǇ is to 
provide digital coding, multiplexing and broadcasting services for terrestrial digital 
television and has been certified by the HTPC only for the first phase of digital 
switchover at 23 points across Greece. Despite the fact that Greek legislation (Law 
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3592/2007) prohibits a network provider to also be a content provider (namely a 
television station) in order to avoid market concentration, Digea is precisely a 
consortium of these same private stations holding equal shares (specifically MEGA, 
ANT1, ALPHA, STAR, SKAI and ALTER, which subsequently closed down). Broadcasts 
from Digea began in the summer of 2009 and its intention from the beginning was to 
dominate the digitization of terrestrial frequencies (Michalitsis, 2013). 
 
The digital switchover process involved the drafting of the so-called ͚map of 
frequencies͛, prepared by the National Technical University of Athens and the 
University of Piraeus and submitted by the Ministry of Infrastructures, Transport and 
Networks to public consultation.  After the 2012 elections and the formation of the 
PASOK/ND coalition government, the new Secretary General of Telecommunications 
in the Ministry assigned a member of the HTPC with the task of remodelling the map. 
The specifications were drafted officially by HTPC but in practice in close cooperation 
with Digea, and the consultations involved 32 companies or physical persons, the 
majority of which asserted that only Digea could take part in this tender. HTPC 
accepted the consultation of Digea as confidential.
20
 
 
According to the auction specifications, two frequencies were assigned to ERT 
(instead of the previous three), four frequencies to national network providers 
(instead of the previous two), and two frequencies to regional network providers. 
ERT was recognized by the law as a network provider and would not pay for the use 
of public frequencies. The remaining six frequencies (four of national and two of 
regional range) were the ones to be auctioned, but in the meantime ERT closed 
down and was left out of the frequencies game.  
 
With Digea controlling already about 95 percent of the clientele of digital 
frequencies, i.e. the content generated by their own channels, competitors were 
already seriously discouraged. Moreover, the competition involved a series of 
provisions designed to serve Digea͛s interests. 21 As a result, and contrary to public 
                                                          
20
 The original plan provided coverage of 97.2 percent of the population with 275 transmission 
centres; if the network provider supplemented these with a number of small transmitters (gap 
fillers), the coverage would reach 99 percent. Digea had objected at the time, claiming the number 
was exaggerated and the cost excessive. A few days after the end of the consultation period (23 
September 2012), and without publishing the proposals that had been submitted, or even informing 
the original drafters, or indeed obtaining any comment from the Ministry, a Joint Ministerial 
Decision was signed and the final frequency map was published (FEK 5/10/2012), which reduced the 
number of transmitters to 156 (NM, interview). 
21
 In order to enter, competitors had to create the same infrastructure of signal transmitters 
(something that Digea already had done over a period of four years) in 90 days since having obtained 
the authorization to take part, something that no competitor could do. Further, no objection could 
be raised unless it was by a competitor that had already passed the first stage (which meant 
investment and cost without any guarantee of actually winning the competition) (NM, interview). 
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procurement regulations, it was allowed for only player (Digea) to take part; the 
whole spectrum of 272 MHz was given to Digea for 15 years at the starting price of 
€18.3 million, as there was no competition. By comparison, the auction competition 
for the digital dividend, i.e. radio spectrum released by the switchover of television 
signals from analog to digital went on for 10 rounds and the spectrum (only 72 MHz) 
was given to three mobile companies for 15 years for €309 million. Additionally, a 
2012 Analysys Mason report estimated the market value of the digital television in 
the next 20 years at €10.3 billion (Analysys Mason, 2012).  
 
In effect, Digea has been upgraded to the sole national player regarding the 
digitization of Greek television.
22
 Prior to its closure ERT͛s digital branch (ERT Digital) 
was broadcasting three digital channels. In their frequencies, the government in an 
unprecedented move decided to broadcast BBC World, Deutsche Welle, Euronews, 
and TV5 Europe. Digea͛s oǁŶers are the ;still uŶliĐeŶsedͿ ŵaiŶ priǀate television 
channels that broadly supported the goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s deĐisioŶ to Đlose doǁŶ ERT. So, 
DTT seems to resemble the analog television era since no channel will have an official 
license to broadcast. The digitization of the terrestrial frequencies and the 
switchover from analog to digital broadcasting is perceived as a missed opportunity 
by the Greek government to regulate GreeĐe͛s largely unregulated television 
landscape. More worryingly, with the demise of ERT and until its successor NERIT 
becomes fully operational, Greece has reached the final development of DTT without 
having a public service broadcaster to participate in the whole process.  
 
To sum up, in the last five years it seems that Digea rather than successive 
governments which decided on the digital compression format (MPEG-4), the digital 
frequencies to be used, and the areas where they would start simulcasting, while the 
regulatory authorities showed preferential treatment of the incumbent commercial 
broadcasters. The entire information campaign for the public has also been left 
entirely to Digea.  
Though legally a separate entity, the digital operator, Digea, as noted above, is 
controlled by the private national channels and is the sole provider of DTT in Greece 
and consequently has a monopoly. This is because 95 percent of television 
households receive their signals over the air and there is an absence of an alternative 
competitive media platform (either satellite or IPTV). It is interesting to consider why 
the Troika, which ensured that the €309 million from the digital dividend were 
included in the state budget of 2014, let go the potential of cashing in another large 
amount through the digital television switchover.  
                                                          
22
 Mr Kostas Chrysogonos, a Member of the European Parliament, asked the European Commission 
in August 2014 what measures it intended to take to protect media freedom, pluralism and healthy 
competition between broadcasters in Greece, given that the entire television spectrum was 
managed by a single company. The European Commission answered in October that the fact that 
only one network operator participated in the auction and was assigned rights of use of the radio-
frequency did not in itself infringe EC law. 
Media Policy and Independent Journalism in Greece DRAFT 20 JAN 2015 
 
28 
 
 
Digea now controls the media landscape and has the power to interrupt any 
emission it does not agree with on air; iŶdeed it did so ǁheŶ E‘T͛s output continued 
to be broadcast through the 902FM channel after the shutdown and was cut by 
Digea, which at the time was only the digital signal provider. The shareholders of 
Digea own the national private television stations and are powerful players in the 
Greek economy associated with the construction industry, shipping and property 
complexes of media. As described above, their vested interests have fed an overall 
pro-austerity broadcasting stance. As a result, Digea͛s ŵoŶopolǇ raises serious 
concerns about pluralism and independent journalism under the current austerity 
conditions, as the presence of anti-austerity voices through its frequencies is 
expected to be limited.  
 
Digea has also significant power over the peripheral channels and charges high sums 
for providing digital services (e.g. demands about €3,500 monthly for each of them 
(plus VAT), with no risk whatsoever. According to the terms of the contract, if one of 
the channels is not in a position to pay, the cost is shifted to the others. Under the 
circumstances, some experts expect the peripheral channels to close down 
eventually or become parts of the mainstream ones, which will then silence any 
alternative anti-austerity voices in the periphery (NM, interview). In addition, the 
reduction of the necessary transmission centres from 275 to 156 means less cost for 
the digital provider, though at the expense of the digital television coverage of the 
country.  Significantly, the local authorities are responsible for bearing the cost of 
any additional infrastructure that might be needed if they are not covered by the 
above transmission centres (e.g. additional transmitters and their maintenance) (FEK 
1693/B/2014). 
Safeguards for journalism 
 
The promotion of the professional interests of journalists employed by newspapers 
and by the electronic media is ensured through the establishment of four regionally 
organized unions, of which two are the most prominent: the Journalists͛ Union of 
Athens Daily Newspapers (ESIEA-JUADN) and the Journalists͛ Union of Macedonia-
Thrace Daily Newspapers (ESIEMTH). The Periodical and Electronic Press Union 
(ESPIT) represents journalists who work for magazines and the online media. 
Grouped under the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Journalists͛ Unions (POESY), the 
uŶioŶs͛ priŶĐipal aiŵ is to Ŷegotiate labor contracts, wages, employment conditions 
and social security benefits with the state and the employers. The unions are also 
tasked ǁith superǀisiŶg jourŶalists͛ ethiĐal perforŵaŶĐe, self-regulatiŶg jourŶalists͛ 
professional behavior, and protecting the principles of journalistic autonomy and 
editorial independence.  
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The Code of Ethics for journalists and audiovisual programs was issued by NCRTV and 
published in 1990 as part of a collective contract signed by JUADN and the 
management of ERT. The rules in the code apply to public broadcasting, both 
national and local, as well as to private radio and television stations. In terms of 
journalism, the Code states that (details can be found in www.esiea.gr):  
 Journalism is a profession.  Truth and its presentation constitute the main concern of the journalist.   The journalist always defends the freedom of the press, the free and 
undisturbed propagation of ideas and news, as well as the right to opposition.   Religious convictions, institutions, manners and customs of nations, people and 
races, as well as citizens' private and family life, are respected and inviolable.   The primary task of the journalist is to protect people's liberties and democracy, 
as well as to advance social and state institutions.   Respect for national and popular values and the protection of people's interests 
should inspire journalists in the practice of their profession.   Journalists should reject any intervention aimed at concealing or distorting the 
truth.  Access to sources of news is free and unhindered for journalists, who are not 
under any obligation to reveal his/her information sources.   The profession of journalism may not be practised for self-seeking purposes.  Journalists do not accept any advantage, benefit, or promise of benefit in 
exchange for the restriction of the independence of their opinion while 
exercising their profession. 
The disciplinary councils of the unions investigate alleged breaches of the code 
mainly on the basis of specific complaints (though this is not necessary), and have 
the power to penalize journalists (i.e. reprimands, suspension of membership, or 
expulsion) found guilty of breaches, such as defamation, distortion of facts or anti-
collegial behaviour. Such penalties apply only to members, which limits self-
regulation through the code, as membership of a professional union is not 
mandatory for journalists (Psychogiopoulou et al., 2011).
23
  
Legislative environment and prosecution of journalists 
Legislative environment 
The Constitution of 1975 guarantees freedom of expression. Article 14, paragraph 1 
deterŵiŶes that ͞eǀerǇ iŶdiǀidual is free to express and propagate their thoughts in 
oral or written form, and through the press, in accordance with the Laǁ͟. Article 14 
also states that the press is free; censorship, as well as the seizure of newspapers 
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 In addition, there is an election process to become a member and a number of requirements that 
must be fulfilled before qualifying, such as a minimum of three years of service as a journalist. 
Media Policy and Independent Journalism in Greece DRAFT 20 JAN 2015 
 
30 
 
and other publications before or after publication, is prohibited. In addition, Article 
14 guarantees the right to reply to errors published in the press or broadcast.   
 
At the same time, the Civil Code, based on articles 2, paragraph 1 and 5, paragraph 1, 
guarantees a right to respect of oŶe͛s persoŶalitǇ, as ǁell as a right to the 
development of all aspects of personality. ArtiĐle ϵA deterŵiŶes that ͞EǀerǇoŶe has 
the right to be protected against the collection, processing and deployment, 
particularly through electronic means, of private data, in accordance with the Law͟ 
(Karakostas and Vrettou 2011).  
This ďaĐkgrouŶd is releǀaŶt to Đases of ŵedia eǆposure of oŶe͛s persoŶal data 
against their will, as the rights protected by the above articles might conflict with 
each other. As the Constitution does not prioritise the right to freedom of speech 
over the right to protection of privacy, competing rights must be balanced ad hoc 
and in relation to the context of each case at hand.  
 
IŶ suĐh Đases, the ŶotioŶ of ͚justified puďliĐ iŶterest͛ is takeŶ iŶto ĐoŶsideratioŶ iŶ 
assessing the balance between the two conflicting rights (right to expression and 
right to proteĐtioŶ of oŶe͛s persoŶalitǇ, reputation, private life, aŶd oŶe͛s persoŶal 
data). Case law recognises the interest (including in their personal data) that public 
figures attract, but only to the extent that this is linked with their public role. It also 
acknowledges that press journalists, in particular, have a justified professional 
interest in bringing to light aspects of private life of such figures when these are 
linked with the political process or have a public role. At the same time, insult, libel 
and slanderous defamation are considered criminal offences (Art. 361-363 of the 
Criminal Code), which constitutes a significant constraint on journalistic freedom. 
Still, the journalists affected may be vindicated if the information published is true 
aŶd ͚justified iŶterest͛ is iŶǀolǀed ;Art. ϯϲϲ, ϯϲϳͿ ;PsǇĐhogiopoulou et al., 2011). 
 
Law 2472/1997, which incorporates the EuropeaŶ DireĐtiǀe ϵϱ/ϰϲ/ΕC, and is based 
on Articles 2 (paragraph 1), 5 (paragraph 1), and 9 and 9A of the Constitution, 
attempts to address the above issue by stipulating that the processing
24
 of simple 
personal data of public figures by the media and their employees is based on a 
judgement about the necessity to satisfy the right to inform and to be informed that 
the processing actor seeks; in the case of more sensitive data,
25
 there must be an 
absolute necessity. Law 2472/1997 does not resolve the issue of competing rights, 
but seems to be providing a slight advantage to the protection of personal data. The 
Authority for Protection of Personal Character Data (DPA), established with Law 
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 The Law covers all activities in the context of journalism that can constitute data processing, from 
investigation and collection, maintenance of data in files or databases, linking with other data, 
exchange or publication of the data. 
25
 Data ͚referriŶg to raĐial or ethŶiĐ origiŶ, politiĐal opiŶions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
membership of a trade-union, health, social welfare and sexual life, criminal charges or convictions, 
as well as membership of soĐieties dealiŶg ǁith the aforeŵeŶtioŶed areas͛. 
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2472/1997, investigates the legality of personal data processing on the basis of the 
above principles (Karakostas and Vrettou 2011).  
 
Audiovisual media content is subject to state regulation. Regulation and self-
regulation
26
 apply to electronic editions of print media, as well as to broadcasting on 
the internet. The liberalisation of broadcasting around 1989-1990 led to Law 
2328/1995, which sought to define the legal rules and norms regulating the structure 
and content of private radio and television.
27
 Law 2472/1997 also applies to 
audiovisual media, while Presidential Decree 77/2003 established a number of 
principles for journalists and media personnel that apply to all public and private 
television and radios: protection of political pluralism and diversity of views, 
prohibition of discrimination, respect for personality and private life, cross-checking 
of information, and the right to preserve the confidentiality of sources 
(Psychogiopoulou et al., 2011). In addition, a recent anti-racist Law 4285/2014 
criminalizes the public expression of hatred (through the press, broadcasting, or the 
internet) against persons or groups on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic origin, 
religion, or sexual orientation. 
Further, Presidential Decree 131/2003 (which transposed the EU Directive on 
electronic commerce and implemented the EU provisions concerning the liability of 
internet intermediaries) regulates content on the basis of the freedom of expression 
and information in the online environment. Internet service providers (ISPs) are 
exempted from any liability regarding the information they transmit or store, but are 
obliged to promptly inform the relevant domestic authorities of any alleged illegal 
activities. However, Article 20(1)(b) stipulates that data protection rules are 
exempted from the scope of application of the Presidential Decree (Psychogiopoulou 
et al., 2011). Liability for content is a thorny issue, notably in the case of blogs. 
Generally speaking, responsibility for content lies with the author or blogger, who 
cannot be identified easily due to the confidentiality of communications (Article 19 of 
                                                          
26
 Law 2863/2000 provided for self-regulation mechanisms by instituting self-regulatory bodies in 
respect of radio and television services. Under this legislation, owners of public and private, free-to-
air or encrypted channels must conclude multi-lateral contracts in which their parties define the 
rules and ethical principles governing the programs broadcast. In this context, several codes have 
been developed, namely the Code of Ethics of Greek journalists, the Code of Conduct for news and 
other political programs, as well as the advertising and communication code governing the content, 
presentation, and promotion of adverts. The development of self-regulatory mechanisms, and in 
particular the drafting of the above codes of conduct, has complemented governmental regulation. 
27
 Laws 1178/1981 and 2328/1995 have determined significant monetary compensation for content 
ǀiolatiŶg oŶe͛s hoŶour, esteeŵ, or reputation. Depending on the intensity of the offence and the 
power and circulation of the outlet, minimal compensation ranges from 100 million drachmas 
;approǆ. €Ϯϵϰ,ϬϬϬͿ for ŶatioŶal television stations to ϯϬ ŵillioŶ draĐhŵas ;approǆ. €ϴϴ,ϬϬϬͿ for loĐal 
television stations, and from ϱϬ ŵillioŶ draĐhŵas ;approǆ. €ϭϰϳ,ϬϬϬͿ for Ŷetǁorked radio statioŶs, 
to 20 million drachmas (approǆ. €ϱϴ,ϳϬϬͿ for ŶoŶ-networked radio stations. 
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the Constitution). Bloggers are not liable for third-party content, but there is an 
ongoing discussion as to how to regulate this type of content, possibly by 
differentiating between content that is political or current affairs and other.   
 
Reviewing a number of recent cases, Vrettou claims that Greek case law generally 
prioritises private data protection over freedom of expression even where there is 
justified public interest. Contrary to the jurisprudence in other European countries, 
and that of the European Court of Human Rights, Greek case law in this matter does 
not follow a fixed set of criteria, such as whether a public figure is involved, whether 
there is justified public interest, whether a journalist acted in good faith, whether the 
claims are based on sound research and investigation, or whether the value 
judgments are based on facts. In effect, ͞Sharp criticism, although provided for by 
the Greek Constitution, is not interpreted in the right way͟ (XV, interview).  
Psychogiopoulou et al. (2011) argue that Greek jurisprudence, as well as 
independent authorities like NCRTV, have been inconsistent; they restrict journalistic 
freedom of expression when political figures are involved, while on the other hand 
they allow blatant violation of privacy. Interviewees confirm that NCRTV operates in 
a very ambivalent way, endorsing conservative values, while often ignoring violation 
of privacy and racist and anti-immigrant broadcasts (AN, DT, interviews).
28
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) constitutes an alternative platform for 
journalists and individuals to seek correction for the infringement of their rights to 
freedom of expression and information in accordance with Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Indeed, the ECtHR has challenged 
doŵestiĐ Đourts͛ Đase laǁ oŶ a Ŷuŵďer of oĐĐasioŶs.29 
 
                                                          
28
 On the social front, NCRTV has fined channels such as MEGA and STAR for showing homosexual 
relationships or airing the views of gay or trans-sexual individuals, often invoking the need to 
prevent corruption of the young. On the other hand, it has not used legal provisions that would let it 
protect minority groups that have become targets of physical attack, verbal abuse, mockery, or 
bullying. A characteristic example was the exposure in the 2012 pre-election period of a number of 
female prostitutes who were obliged to be tested for HIV following a pledge by two ministers to 
protect the male population (something that may have boosted their re-election chances). 
Photographs of these women were shown on all mainstream channels, clearly violating their dignity 
and medical confidentiality. When NCRTV was asked to intervene, it refused to do so (AN, interview). 
29
 In a famous case, Nikitas Lionarakis, a journalist and television presenter, was brought to justice 
with defamation charges for statements made in his ERT program by a guest against another invitee 
who was a well-known lawyer involved in the case of Abdullah Ocalan. The domestic courts ordered  
Lionarakis to pay EUR 161,408 for the damage sustained; after a settlement in the domestic courts 
the amount was reduced to EUR 41,067.48. Lionarakis resorted to the ECtHR, which held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), § 10 (right to freedom 
of speech) of the Convention, considering, in particular, that the journalist and coordinator could not 
be held liable in the same way as the person who had made remarks that were possibly 
controversial, insulting or defamatory (ECtHR, Lionarakis vs. Greece (1131/2005)). 
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Prosecution of journalists 
Against this legal and regulatory background, journalists are often faced with 
accusations and lawsuits for defamation or ǀiolatioŶ of oŶe͛s priǀaĐǇ aŶd eǆposure of 
personal data. Large sums of compensation can be sought in cases of insult or libel 
and this is considered a serious hurdle to freedom of expression and in particular to 
investigative journalism. 
As one of our interviewees and JUADN representative mentioned, ͞PuďliĐ figures 
exploit the legal framework to resort to lawsuits that require high compensations 
either from the media organization or newspaper or the journalists involved. The 
legal framework͛s aiŵ is to protect individuals from yellow journalism but it has now 
become a weapon in the hands of powerful businessmen and organizations. The 
position of the trade unions is that this abuse needs to stop and that we need to find 
a new law for defamation of character, as the public figures should be checked 
striĐtlǇ͟ ;DT, interview). 
In October 2011, investigative journalist Kostas Vaxevanis was arrested and charged 
with violation of privaĐǇ oǀer the puďliĐatioŶ of the ͚Lagarde List͛, exposing  Greek 
tax evaders with Swiss bank accounts. Vaxevanis was tried and acquitted twice 
(second time in November 2013). However, he has been constantly involved in 
lawsuit Đases iŶ reĐeŶt Ǉears: ͞I ĐurreŶtlǇ haǀe over 40 pending court cases. This is a 
full-time job and it incurs large amounts of money even in order to be represented at 
Court͟ ;KV, interview).  
Diaploki and the triangle of power described above create circumstances that are 
quite unfavourable to objective and investigative journalism. Dealings between 
entrepreneurial interests (including banking ones) and the state can take many 
shapes and forms, including often using legislation to accommodate particular 
business interests. Such dealings are often ignored in the mainstream media – the 
terŵ ͚oŵerta͛, deŶotiŶg a code of silence, has been used by many interviewees to 
picture this situation of extensive cover-up of scandals.    
When exposed by alternative media these affairs generate confrontation between 
the individuals whose interests have been revealed (entrepreneurs and politicians) 
and the journalists involved. The magazines Unfollow and HotDoc have been on the 
receiving end of many lawsuits for exposing scandals. Resorting to legal action is the 
most common reaction, but not the only one. More explicit practices have been 
followed, including blatantly false claims, direct threats against journalists͛ personal 
and family life, conspiratorial practices involving forgery, secret surveillance, or 
burglaries and stealing of sensitive data. In most cases, these incidents have not been 
covered by the mainstream media at all (KV, interview; Reuters, 2012b). 
 
Recently, growing violence and physical attacks against journalists have also been 
visible. For example, in the recent months, police shut down student-run radio 
stations in Athens, Patras and Xanthi. A number of journalists have been attacked 
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and injured during protests agaiŶst the ĐouŶtrǇ͛s austeritǇ ŵeasures. In April 2012, 
Marios Lolos, president of the Union of Greek Photojournalists, was beaten by the 
police while covering a protest and had to undergo brain surgery. Journalists were 
also attacked by individuals affiliated with Golden Dawn neo-fascist party, such as 
the SKAI reporter Michael Tezaris who was beaten by members of Golden Dawn at 
an anti-immigrant demonstration (Freedom House 2012).  
The techniques for suppressing and marginalizing good-quality journalism overall and 
investigative journalism in particular cannot be over-emphasised. Nonetheless, a 
related problem identified by some interviewees has been the violation of the Code 
of Ethics of Greek journalists: ͞Often alternative media violate the Code of Conduct 
and do not conform to professional rules. My view is that before exposing somebody 
and possibly leading them to prison you have to communicate with them and 
confront them; this is something that is ǀerǇ rarelǇ doŶe͟ ;TT iŶterǀieǁͿ. 
A prevalent phenomenon is the uncritical and unchecked reproduction of 
information by well-known journalists and radio and television reporters. The term 
͚vaporakia͛ (little vessels) has been coined for journalists who, intentionally or 
unintentionally, serve a particular agenda without exercising their mental faculties or 
without employing ethical principles and abiding by the Code of Conduct. It may 
come as no surprise that violations of the Code are becoming more pronounced 
under austerity and the current crisis of journalism.  
The rise of the internet is of increasing significance, as it offers a platform for 
journalists who have been excluded, persecuted, or simply presented with no 
alternative. Nevertheless, it can also function in the opposite way: journalists who 
operate independently and bring affairs of public interest to light, but are 
subsequently prosecuted and led to court on accusations of libel, often face a 
humiliating exposure on anonymous blogs, which clearly violate any Code of 
Conduct: ͞No jourŶalist, not even the most respectable, can come out of this process 
untarnished͟ ;NL, interview).     
When Reuters were conducting their investigation into the banks in Greece in 2012, 
quite a few blogs alleged – anonymously – that the journalists involved were agents 
of foreign interests. ͞During the same period a certain blog published anonymously 
that I had received €50,000 from secret services. I brought a lawsuit for defamation 
and was told by Google that the blogger could not be identified because the blog was 
under U.S. law. This is significant for freedom of the press, as it means that you can 
be a victim of defamation by somebody who writes anonymously and gets away with 
it͟ ;KV, interview). 
Regarding its content, then, the Internet is currently a space where regulation is 
uncertain and the following features seem to prevail:  
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 verbatim reproduction of the same news, with no editorial or other control, 
through unauthorized replication of intellectual property;
30
  content based on entertainment of the lowest quality and gossip  a platform where racist, xenophobic or sexist messages can be produced and 
find an audience (AN, DT interviews). 
Individuals/organizations for media reform/ethics/accountability  
Measured in organizations and participation rates, civil society in Greece has 
traditionally been limited. In practice, non-governmental organizations are often 
dependent on state mechanisms. Relations among the state, business, and labour 
have been characterized by disjointed corporatism, whereby labour unions tend to 
be controlled by the state and the political parties, while the policy and regulatory 
capacities of the state regarding business remain weak. However, informal civil 
society channels are significant, and there are also strong professional associations 
which have traditionally safeguarded their own interests (Lavdas 2005, Voulgaris 
2006, Sotiropoulos 2004).  
Historically, the media sector has lacked a movement or a visible civil society 
organization working for media reform. This remains the case under the current 
austerity conditions. JUADN and ESIEMTH, as well as other trade unions (e.g. Union 
of Photojournalists), work to protect their members against austerity and adverse 
working conditions, as described above. In addition, they seem to have adopted a 
milder stance against employers and their practices for fear of media closures and 
their impact on journalists (MN, GD, EI, interviews). Apart from the trade union 
associations, there does not seem to be much activity for media reform and freedom 
at the level of civil society. Still, there is clear evidence of attempts to build informal 
networks and professional self-organization in the sector. 
In spring 2014, the Educational Department of JUADN cooperated with POESY to 
create an Observatory recording phenomena of racism and fascism, as well the role 
of the media in instigating or exacerbating them. This has already started work, albeit 
without many resources (though it has been supported by the UN authorities) and on 
a voluntary basis. It is about to publish an evaluation report on the representation of 
sensitive groups and issues by media at the time of the 2014 European elections.
31
 As 
                                                          
30
 ͞I used to ǁork for the website of a very well-known journalist; we were instructed to write 50 
pieces of news every eight hours, which we copied and pasted from other sites, without 
confirmation, checking original sources, expertise, or a critical approach͟ (EI interview). 
31
 A methodological tool (questionnaire) was developed to assess whether different angles were 
presented, or whether aggressive language was avoided. The tool was applied to a collection of 
articles published in May and June 2014 by a number of mainstream papers, including Ta Nea, To 
Vima, Eleftheros Typos, Democratia, Ethnos, Kathimerini, EfSyn and Eleftherotypia, Prwto Thema, 
Real. 
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our interviewee put it: ͞The iŶteŶtioŶ is to Đreate a Code of EthiĐs regardiŶg the 
presentation of topics of racism, migration, fascism, etc. that we hope the media will 
adopt. There has been a wide consultation with various agencies to this end, 
including anti-fascist organizations and academics. However, lack of resources is a 
problem and at the moment we rely on voluntary work.  We intend to apply for 
EuropeaŶ FuŶds ǁheŶ the ĐoŶditioŶs are ripe͟ ;X“, interview).  
Our interviews also identified a problem that can be seen as endemic and cultural, 
and has been exacerbated in the current fiscal crisis. In traditional readings of Greek 
history, society and culture, the polarization engendered by the Civil War of the 
1940s, the prevalence of clientelism, the politically-appointed trade unions, the self-
interested acquisitiveness of professional associations, the over-reliance on the 
family and dissociation from broader social groups, have contributed to social 
heterogeneity and prevented the development of a universalistic and collective 
culture (Petmesidou, 1996). These historical features seem to have been reproduced 
under the present circumstances, in a cleavage between individuals, groups, and 
organizations, including journalists, who often demonstrate insurmountable 
disagreements depending on their political orientation (NL, interview).  
This cleavage often presents itself in mobilisation attempts: ͞We Đaŵe together 18 
months ago to make a union of investigative journalists, but we had disagreements 
regarding the political positioning of the union. For example, with regard to 
fundraising sources: certain journalists on the Left did not want to pursue fundraising 
from mainstream organizations or private funders, which they saw as a compromise. 
This and other disagreements reflected the current schism and polarization in Greek 
society between systemic and anti-systemic journalists.
32
 There is widespread 
suspiĐioŶ aŵoŶg us͟ ;TT, interview). 
Universities have also been to some extent active in potential media reform. There 
have also been proposals for a Media Observatory in the past, but they have not 
materialized, as they were resisted by the Executive Board of JUADN (LN, interview). 
Further, disagreements about what is progressive and topical are apparently ample 
within the trade unions. Currently JUADN organizes, together with the Church, 300 
packs of food per month for unemployed journalists, with the intention to  increase 
them to 500, but has been criticized for this cooperation (MK, interview). Likewise, 
JUADN in cooperation with Panteion University has organized an Academy for 
Journalists, which has stimulated reactions on the basis of the argument that JUADN 
should be about mobilizations and not about founding Academies which will serve 
the purposes of some members only. Similar reactions are expected with the 
Observatory when it comes to the issue of funding; generally there is a guild logic, 
which many considered short-sighted and old fashioned (XS, interview). 
                                                          
32
 This terminology is widely used in Greece to differentiate between journalists who work in 
mainstream media and tend to be favourable towards the austerity measures, and those who are 
employed in non-mainstream, alternative media and are often critical of austerity policies. 
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The very existence of the independent ERT program, or ERT-Open, run by former ERT 
employees who refused to leave ERT premises in June 2013
33
 represents a de facto 
initiative for greater freedom of speech and pluralism of content. It has been 
supported by local communities who have mobilized alongside ERT employees for 
the installations to remain open. It is based on self-organization, with horizontal 
structures and collective decision-making. A number of former ERT employees are 
involved in formulating the program, and editorial decisions are taken on the basis of 
expertise. This can be seen a vehicle for the production not only of content in the 
spirit of culture that characterised the old ERT at its best, but also of political 
messages of resistance, emphasis on the need for re-opening ERT, as well as critical 
comments on current affairs (e.g. regarding the potential privatization of the water 
utility). It is also supported by a movement which aims at the re-opening ERT, which 
includes the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Unions of Employees at ERT (POSPERT), as 
well as Ŷuŵerous iŶdiǀiduals ͚iŶ solidaritǇ ǁith E‘T͛. POSPERT provides funding for 
the independent program, while JUADN and POESY also contribute (MN, GD , KK, EI, 
interviews). 
There is currently a search for alternative journalism and media models that are 
economically viable without being part of diaploki, with some successful examples. 
The common features in these alternative models have been that the actors who 
started them were obstructed in their attempts to inform objectively, while also 
realising that the Greek public currently needs proper news. The Press Project is such 
an initiative; created in 2010, it began by aggregating news and subsequently 
evolved into an alternative news medium, which is internet-based 
(thepressproject.gr). In just two years it has been receiving almost two million unique 
visits each month. The Press Project does not accept any advertising from Greek 
banks and government, on the basis that these have been linked to manipulation of 
information, and pursues alternative ways by relying on its audience. It has an 
international, English-language version with links to international outlets such as The 
Guardian, and also a web-TV which has just started broadcasting.
34
 
Generally speaking, such models often operate in the logic of social 
entrepreneurship, which goes beyond the traditional media enterprise model and its 
dependencies (LN, interview). They are also informed by a more general mobilisation 
of citizens towards self-organisation for solidarity, creation of alternative economic 
                                                          
33
 ERT-Open transmits one television channel from Thessaloniki (where the installations of ERT3 are 
still controlled by former ERT personnel), two radio channels (from Athens and Thessaloniki), and 
another 15 peripheral channels from the old public radio installations (which have not been 
controlled by the police), as well as one internet site.  
34
 The Press Project was first to publish the Greek diplomatic cables from WikiLeaks, produced a 
successful doĐuŵeŶtarǇ aďout the Đrisis ;͚DeďtoĐraĐǇ͛ by Aris Xatzistefanou), and provided  ERT with 
media servers to keep its program going when the government shut it down.  
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and social organisation and resistance against dominant political rhetoric, with a 
proliferation of relevant citizen-based organisations (see omikronproject.gr for a list).  
Attempts at self-organization in the media include the The Editors͛ Newspaper 
(EfSyn), which was generated from the closing down of Eleftherotypia and staffed by 
redundant employees who formed a journalistic co-operative. It is based on two 
parallel and independent structures, the first dealing with logistics and management 
and the other with content (DT, KK, interviews). Another successful outlet is the 
monthly magazine Unfollow, which started in 2011, when a number of journalists 
who had been laid off from mainstream media put together personal funds that 
were enough to publish a single issue; it has since achieved a circulation of over 
10,000 copies and has about 8,000 subscribers (LH, interview).  
Crowdfunding has sometimes been used successfully but economic conditions in 
Greece are unfavorable. Examples of individual efforts include the documentaries of 
Aris Xatzistefanou, who was fired from SKAI, which explain and analyse the crisis in 
Greece, as well as those of George Avgeropoulos. The Press Project also campaigned 
successfully for donations to support publication of the Lux Leaks affair in a special 
printed issue in order to reach people who do not have internet access. Overall, 
however, there is a distinct shortage of entrepreneurs to finance investigative 
journalism (KK, NM, interviews). 
Self-organization is also facilitated by the rise of the internet. Alternative voices have 
proliferated in recent years thanks to the internet combined with the increasing lay-
offs from mainstream media and the mounting pressures on journalism (Redwire.gr, 
Katalipsiesiea.blogspot.gr, Alterthess.gr, and Alfavita.gr, to name but four). Internet-
based radio stations, most of which operate on a voluntary basis, can be identified 
(Radiobubble, Indymedia Athens, EntasiFM and many others), as well as web TV 
stations, such as Omniatv.com. Other examples include websites that provide 
informative content, such as Rednotebook.gr, Left.gr, Iskra.gr, Leftlab.gr, and E-
dromos.gr. In parallel, there has been a rise of specialized sites that can be seen as 
performing a watchdog function, such as antigoldgr.org of the Hellenic Mining 
Watch, which investigates mining activities, or 360pedia.org which reports on 
educational issues (MN, GD, interviews).   
Indeed many of the serious alternative media outlets, such as the Press Project, or 
less known and more specialized sites have been financially sustainable (or almost) 
by operating electronically and without physical presence, while others with offline 
presence still maintain websites for easy updates, real-time coverage and so on. In 
this way, the internet provides opportunities for pluralism. On the other hand, many 
internet sites replicate the phenomena of intertwining interests by carrying 
advertisements by the state or the banks and becoming subject to their control, thus 
compromising independence: ͞The internet is also largely based on ads, so there is a 
myth about free information on it; it is a matter of what information can you get. 
Generally, reliance on ads means that those paying for ads control the content; the 
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public needs to understand that under these circumstances they do not get real 
iŶforŵatioŶ aŶd theǇ are Ŷot free to aĐĐess iŶforŵatioŶ͟ ;LH, interview). 
Furthermore, the internet has hitherto escaped content regulation to a large extent; 
it also evades fiscal and financial regulations, working conditions and pay and so on. 
As suĐh, ͞The internet becomes a space of uncontrolled entrepreneurship, with poor 
working conditions and employee exploitation͟ ;AN, interview).  
Conclusions 
Throughout the Metapolitefsi (the post-1974) period, media organizations (from the 
press to radio and television) have been implicated in complex intertwining of 
political and economic interests. In a nutshell, successive New Democracy and PASOK 
administrations have created a media environment that is chaotic on the surface but 
in fact deeply controlled by the state and by prominent private interests (Leandros, 
2013). The current New Democracy-PASOK coalition government has shown no signs 
of reversing this trend. 
The so-Đalled ͚triaŶgle of poǁer͛ ;NL, KV, DT, interviews), which involves the political 
system, economic interests (including the banking system) and media corporations is 
both weakened (as disenchantment of the public under austerity has grown) and 
strengthened (through the development of tighter bonds of complicity). Diaploki has 
become more pronounced under austerity, as mainstream media now routinely 
conspire in favour of austerity measures and are uncritical towards the state and the 
banking system, which in turn supports them and their enterprises through public 
projects and advertising.  
 
The legal limbo and institutional corruption around the media benefit the major 
media groups and their owners and disadvantage new entrants, helping to keep 
them out of the marketplace. The involvement of mainstream media corporations in 
the digital switchover process was a central factor behind the closure of ERT, a 
drastic step that was quite in keeping with the authoritarian and anti-democratic 
traditioŶs of GreeĐe͛s political system (see Nevradakis, 2013). 
  
Austerity has led to the closure of several media outlets (newspapers and television 
channels), while also contributing to the rise of several internet-based media. The 
latter, while offering the potential for pluralism and of supporting alternative voices, 
seem to suffer from overall low quality: they host xenophobic, intolerant and racist 
views; they rely on replication of the same material from a limited number of news 
sources; or they depend on advertising by major banks, thereby perpetuating 
dependence. 
  
Austerity has added to the pressure on journalists in many ways: self-regulation so as 
to safeguard their job, low-status work conditions and very low salaries, increased 
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editorial control and censorship of critical views on governmental policies, in order to 
maintain the sensitive balance of diaploki. 
  
This landscape has created unfavourable conditions for independent journalism, 
which is more or less marginalized for a number of reasons:  lack of resources and 
staff; poor work conditions and very low pay; continuous accusations of libel and 
court cases that bear a heavy financial burden for those who choose to remain 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt, ďlaĐkŵail aŶd threats agaiŶst oŶe͛s life aŶd faŵilǇ, ŵurder atteŵpts of 
intimidation, or physical violence (including beatings) from police during 
demonstrations. 
  
Trade unions, though present and visible, have weakened significantly, not least in 
terms of their membership, as flexibility, low rewards and precariousness have 
resulted in lower membership rates. Civil society, albeit rejuvenated on the solidarity 
front to provide means of subsistence to the categories of people affected by 
austerity, including journalists (e.g. by the provision of food, clothing, and other 
donations), has not mobilised around the promotion of media reform 
(including accountability, transparency, pluralism, and freedom of expression), with 
very few exceptions. 
  
As mainstream media have proven economically unsustainable and more intertwined 
and under the pressures of austerity, redundancies and deterioration of working 
conditions, informal mechanisms of self-organized groups and networks of 
journalists and other media personnel have started exploring new models of 
journalistic production, such as the Editors͛ Newspaper (EfSyn) (AN, DT, interviews). 
  
Investigative journalism has also reacted by establishing alternative (non-
mainstream) outlets and alternative business models, examples of which are the 
magazines Unfollow and HotDoc (which are sustainable because of circulation 
success and advertising, though not by big business), and the online Press Project 
site, which also relies on advertising.  
 
The internet, in spite of its limitations, is beginning to host alternative voices or 
watchdog type journalism and thus offers potential for strengthening pluralism and 
transparency. However, the general problem of funding journalism and new 
production is replicated online: advertising revenue does not suffice to support 
quality journalism. This creates the risk that intricate political and economic interests 
may be replicated online to ensure funding (through advertising or under the table 
deals) for sites that they can control, at the expense of independent journalism. 
Indeed, such trends are visible, as is the proliferation of low quality, gossip-based, or 
blatantly plagiarized content from one internet site to another. 
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If the media landscape under austerity creates bleak conditions for media freedom 
and for journalists to earn a livelihood, then a post-austerity agenda could restart the 
economy and have a positive impact on employment circumstances for journalists. 
The materialization of the pledges of the political opposition SYRIZA to re-open ERT 
and to conduct a competition for granting legal licenses to private channels could 
contribute to a redrawing of the media landscape. Regulatory authorities that 
function more independently will also be crucial in this. 
 
In the meantime, as the need for the public to be informed is pressing, greater 
attempts at self-organization might offer an exit from the web of diaploki, 
censorship, and humiliation. These attempts will face inescapable problems in 
finding sustainable revenue models that depend neither on pro bono services nor on 
advertising. Regular funding will be essential to success. If alternative, regular 
sources of funding can be guaranteed they might offer the long-term potential for a 
landscape where media and extra-media activities cease to co-exist and information 
and democracy can function more effectively. Participation in such attempts by non-
professional entities, including a more active role for universities and a more visible 
presence for NGOs, might be instrumental. Last but not least, journalists will bear the 
responsibility for honouring their profession by contributing objective and truthful 
content iŶ this ͚Đold Đliŵate͛.  
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Appendix 1: Main players in the Greek media landscape 
Table 1: Leading daily newspapers in Greece (2012) 
Title Ownership Daily sales  
(in 000) 
Political stance Chain 
membership 
TA NEA Lambrakis 
Group 
38 Liberal TV: MEGA 
Channel 
Press: papers; 
magazines; 
travel; culture 
Kathimerini Alafouzos 
family 
36 Independent Radio: SKAI FM 
and Melodia 
FM; press: 
magazines; 
TV: SKAI TV; 
shipping 
Eleftherotypia Tegopoulos 
Publishing 
Ceased 
publication 
in 2011; 
Republished 
in January 
2013 
Liberal  TV: MEGA 
Channel 
Press: 
magazines 
Telecoms 
services 
Ethnos  Pegasus 
(Bobolas 
family)  
26 Liberal  TV: MEGA 
Channel 
Press: 
magazines 
Construction  
Eleftheros 
Typos  
Press 
Foundation 
(now D. 
Mpenekos and 
A. Skanavis) 
15 Conservative  Used to have 
shares in STAR 
Channel 
Rizospastis  Greek 8.3 Communist  Radio station 
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Communist 
Party 
͚ϵϬϮ Aristera 
sta FM͛ 
Vradyni Vradyni Ltd (K. 
Mitsis) 
3.0 Conservative  Magazines  
Avgi SYRIZA - Left 
Coalition Party 
2.8 Left 
Radio station: 
͚“to KokkiŶo 
FM͛ 
Source: Athens Association of Newspaper Publishers; Papathanassopoulos, 2014b 
 
Table 2:  Average Circulation of National Political Newspapers (1955-2011) 
 
Year Circulation 
1955 330,000 
1965 600,000 
1975 630,000 
1985 1,100,000 
1995 620,000 
2005 400,000 
2011 216,500 
Source: JUADN;  
 
Table 3: Annual % audience shares of the main Greek television channels (2010-
2013) 
Year ET1 NET ET3 ANT1 MEGA ALPHA STAR ALTER SKAI 
2010 3.0 9.5 3.6 15.1 20.2 12.2 9.7 10.9 4.0 
2011 2.5 7.7 3.4 16.7 19.8 12.9 10.3 8.9 4.9 
2012 2.6 8.1 3.0 16.8 21.5 12.0 10.8 Closed 4.6 
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2013 Closed Closed Closed 17.3 22.0 12.4 11.1 Closed 4.9 
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research 
 
Table 4: Advertising spend in print and electronic media (2000-2011) (€ million)  
Year  Newspapers  Magazines  Radio  Television  Total  
2001 255,3 532,2 70,8 661,0 1,519.3 
2003 302,4 684,7 98,5 720,8 1,806.4 
2005 407,4 886,2 113,9 784,7 2,192.2 
2007 499,7 1,047.5 165,6 941,5 2,654.3 
2009 441,7 889,8 166,2 714,8 2,212.5 
2011 359,9 579,9 87,8 566,3 1,593,9 
Source: Media Services 
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Figure 1: Online Publisher Groups (by number of unique browsers)
 
Source: AT Internet   
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Appendix 2: List of Interviewees 
  
Journalists 
Aggela Ntarzanou    (AN)    Avgi newspaper 
Kostas Vaxevanis      (KV)  HotDoc magazine 
Dimitris Trimis   (DT)  EfSyn newspaper   
Tasos Telloglou   (TT)  Kathimerini newspaper and STAR channel 
Lefteris Haralampopoulos (LH)  Unfollow Magazine 
Nikolas Leontopoulos (NL)   The Press Project 
Pavlos Klaudianos    (PK)  Epohi newspaper 
Xaris Savvidis            (XS)  Imerisia Newspaper 
Giannhs Darras         (GD)  Former editor for ERT Digital and www.360pedia.gr 
Kostas Karikis    (KK)  News editor for independent program of ET3 
Eleni Iliopoulou    (EI)  www.zougla.gr and www.zoosos.gr 
 
Lawyers  
Xristina Vrettou        (XV)  Attorney at Law, PhD on freedom of speech  
Apostolos Tsalapatis (AT)  Attorney at Law, Legal Adviser to JUADN  
Antonis Petridis         (AP)     Attorney at Law, Legal Adviser for www.stokokkino.gr  
 
Trade Union representatives 
Marilena Katsimi     (MK)  General Secretary of JUADN 
Maxh Nikolara            (MN)   ALPHA 98.9 and ERT jourŶalists͛ represeŶtatiǀe in JUADN 
 
Other  
Nikos Michalitsis (NM)   Former ERT Director of Technical Services 
Nikos Leandros  (LN)  Professor of Media, Panteion University 
 
 
 
